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Federal Court Review of Arbitrary State Court Decisions 
INTRODUCTION 
Occasionally, decisions by state courts or agencies on civil matters 
or criminal proceedings1 seem entirely arbitrary. An "arbitrary" deci-
sion is one that appears irrational because it conflicts with the factual 
record, conflicts with statutes or precedent, or contradicts itself.2 The 
Supreme Court's position on whether arbitrary state decisions violate 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is inconsistent. 
On one hand, the Court, relying on the well-established principle of 
federalism that federal courts may not review the correctness of state 
decisions of state law,3 has held that the arbitrariness of a state deci-
sion does not raise any issues of federal constitutional law. Thus, in 
cases where a state court or agency apparently has misinterpreted state 
law, the Court has held that "mere errors of state law" do not violate 
due process.4 In addition, the Court has been reluctant to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in state civil proceedings. 5 The Court has 
also been unwilling to require the state court or agency to explain any 
1. For the purposes of this Note, state decisions encompass (1) state court and agency deci· 
sions on civil matters and (2) state court and agency decisions in criminal proceedings not consti-
tuting findings of misconduct that ignore the threat of prison confinement. Examples from the 
second category include sentencing decisions, but not criminal convictions or parole revocations. 
2. Cf. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1946) (defining "arbitrary" as 
"without adequate determining principle" or "[f]ixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or 
by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or 
significance, .•. decisive but unreasoned"). 
3. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Walt.) 590 (1874). 
4. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 951 n.8 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting that 
"mere error of state law" in a death penalty case does not violate due process); Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1981) ("We have long recognized that a 'mere error of state law' is not a 
denial of due process. If the contrary were true, then every erroneous decision by a state court on 
state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.") (citation omitted) 
(quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948)); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 
n.9 (1980) ("It must be remembered that even if a state decision does deprive an individual of life 
or property, and even ifthat decision is erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the decision 
violated that individual's right to due process."); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) 
("state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law, and ... we are bound by their construe· 
tions except in extreme circumstances") (citation omitted); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 
554-55 (1962) ("We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment 'does not assure 
uniformity of judicial decisions ... [or] immunity from judicial error .•• .' Were it otherwise, 
every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional question.") 
(citation omitted) (quoting Milwaukee Elec. R.R. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel. Milwaukee, 
252 U.S. 100, 106 (1920)); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (mere error in reaching 
a jury verdict does not violate due process); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 455 (1924) 
("The mere reversal by a state court of its previous decision, as in this case before us, whatever its 
effect upon contracts, does not, as we have seen, violate any clause of the Federal Constitution.''). 
5. See, e.g., American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U.S. 215, 231 (1974); Townsend 
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981) (state 
court findings presumed to be correct in federal habeas corpus proceedings). 
2010 
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inconsistencies in its decisions. 6 
On the other hand, the Court appears to have reached an opposite 
result in three cases, suggesting that due process does require reversal 
of arbitrary state decisions in cases in which the state decision lacked 
evidentiary support or deviated from state law. In Thompson v. City of 
Louisville, 7 the Court reversed a state criminal conviction that 
presented "the stark problem of arbitrariness" because the decision 
was entirely lacking in evidentiary support. 8 In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 9 
the Court reversed a state sentencing decision that constituted an "ar-
bitrary deprivation" because the decision applied an "invalid" statute. 
Finally, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 10 the Court reversed an 
entitlement decision that constituted an "arbitrary" state action be-
cause the state's established procedure denied a state-created entitle-
ment in a "random" manner. 11 Together these cases may be viewed as 
providing support for a substantive due process rule against arbitrary 
state decisions, 12 even though they did not explicitly rely on substan-
tive due process grounds. 13 
Although arguably Thompson, Logan, and Hicks support a rule 
against arbitrary state civil decisions, the Supreme Court has elected 
to read those cases narrowly or to avoid the issue altogether. 14 In the 
6. See, e.g., Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981) (apparently inconsistent verdicts); Con-
necticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (denying application for commu-
tation oflife sentence); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 (1978) (explanation of reasons 
supporting a trial court decision "not constitutionally mandated"). 
7. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). As this Note will be referring extensively to this case, Thompson will 
hereinafter be cited only when direction to specific pages is needed, or when the reference is 
especially helpful. 
8. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315.(1979) (describing Thompson). Although Thomp-
son dealt with a criminal conviction, its broad language has made it unclear whether the decision 
applies to state civil decisions, in addition to state criminal decisions. See Thompson, 362 U.S. at 
204. 
9. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
10. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
11. 455 U.S. at 433-34. 
12. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (The Court infers that the Thompson no 
evidence rule is a substantive due process rule.) A number of courts of appeals have ruled that 
one has a substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary state decisions. See, e.g., Shelton 
v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (arbitrary denial of zoning 
variance may violate due process); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 (4th Cir. 
1983) (arbitrary denial of building permit may violate due process); Evans v. City of Chicago, 
689 F.2d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir. 1982) (delayed payment of tort judgment in violation of state law 
may violate due process). The court of appeals cases that have applied the Hicks rule have not 
described the rule in terms of a procedural or substantive due process right. See Part 111.C infra. 
13. In Thompson, the Court did not indicate whether the no-evidence rule was based on 
procedural or substantive due process. 362 U.S. at 199. But in Superintendent, Mass. Correct. 
Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Court described an identical "some evidence" stan-
dard as a procedural due process rule. See Part I.A.1.b infra. Both Logan, 455 U.S. at 432-34, 
and Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346, were based upon procedural due process grounds. 
14. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 387 n.4 (1986) (reading Hicks narrowly as a proce-
dural due process case); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985); Pulley 
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absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the courts of 
appeals have taken opposing positions on the issue. 
Several courts of appeals have read the Thompson, Logan, and 
Hicks decisions broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state deci-
sions. The Sixth Circuit decision in Spruytte v. Walters 15 provides a 
good example of how the rule against arbitrary state decisions has 
been applied in practice. In Spruytte, the court applied the rule 
against arbitrary state decisions to a state prison board's decision to 
prohibit a prisoner from receiving a dictionary from his mother. The 
court, after concluding that the applicable state law only permitted the 
prison to prohibit prisoners from receiving books that posed a threat 
to security, 16 held that the decision to prohibit the dictionary was un-
constitutionally arbitrary, because the decision both lacked evidentiary 
support and deviated from state law. The court found doctrinal sup-
port for this rule against arbitrary decisions in the Thompson and 
Logan decisions.11 
Other circuits have also used the rule against arbitrary state deci-
sions. For example, the Eighth Circuit applied the Thompson doctrine 
to review a state educational institution decision that appeared to lack 
evidence.18 Reviewing a variety of state decisions, job terminations, 
and business license revocations, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits have interpreted Logan broadly to support a rule against arbi-
trary state decisions that appeared to violate state law. 19 Finally, after 
reviewing state sentencing decisions that appeared to apply incorrect 
statutes, the Fifth Circuit has held that Hicks supports a ru!e against 
arbitrary state decisions.20 
A number of commentators have also advocated a broad rule 
against arbitrary state civil decisions.21 In support of this rule, they 
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322-24 (1975) (expressly declin-
ing to decide whether Thompson applied to state school board decisions). 
15. 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). 
16. 753 F.2d at 507-08. 
17. The court relied on Thompson in holding that the decision violated due process because 
the state officials deprived Spruytte of his dictionary without a determination "that the book 
posed a threat to security." 753 F.2d at 509. The Court also relied on Logan in holding that the 
state decision violated due process because the prison "willfully [and] systematically refused to 
follow state law." 753 F.2d at 510. 
18. See notes 165 & 183-86 infra and accompanying text. 
19. See notes 190-94 infra and accompanying text. 
20. See notes 227-28 infra and accompanying text. 
21. Although these commentators differ in their formulation of the rule, all are concerned 
about arbitrary state decisions that conflict with the facts in the record, conflict with the statutes 
or precedent, or contradict themselves. See J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 217 & n.6 (1979) 
(rule of Jaw applies primarily to prohibit arbitrary judicial Jaw application, rather than arbitrary 
judicial Jaw creation); Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 594, 630 
(1984) Gudges must follow rule of "governmental consistency"); Morgan, The Right To Know 
Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 299-317 (1982) [hereinafter Morgan, Right To Know 
Why] (courts should explain apparently internally inconsistent decisions); Morgan, Playing by 
the Rules: Due Process and Errors of State Procedural Law, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 29 (1985) 
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rely on Thompson, Logan, and Hicks, 22 Administrative Procedures 
[hereinafter Morgan, Playing by the Rules] ("fair play model" requires courts and agencies to 
comply with duly established procedural safeguards when depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property); Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a 
Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 80, 85 (1976) (employees terminated from status 
relationships should have a right to "an adequate explanation" for the dismissal); Rubin, Admin-
istrative Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1044, 1103 (1984) (rule of 
law requires "treatment of individuals in accordance with legal standards"); Smolla, The Erosion 
of the Principle That the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. · 
472, 500 (1984) (court and agency decisions should meet "base requirement of fidelity to the 
ordinary meaning of words" when deciding on existence of entitlements created by statutes or 
regulations); Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on 
Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CALIF. L. REV. 423, 434 (1986) (judges, as a 
matter of policy, should supply "candidly articulated reasons for decision[s]" to help reduce 
judicial manipulation of information in furtherance of unarticulated norms); Van Alstyne, 
Cracks in "the New Property'~· Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL 
L. REV. 445, 487-88 (1977) (individuals should have a right to be free from "arbitrary adjudica-
tive procedures" that are "fundamentally unfair, biased, arbitrary, summary, peremptory, ex 
parte means that without justification create an intolerable margin of probable error or preju-
dice"); Note, Protecting State Procedural Rights in Federal Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1027 
n.29, 1045-46 n.126 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Procedural Rights] (due process should prohibit 
"arbitrary" state court and agency deprivations of procedural entitlements); Note, Supreme 
Court Review of State Findings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. REV. 328, 
334 (1962) [hereinafter Note, State Fact Findings] (due process should prohibit "arbitrary" state 
court findings of facts that result in deprivation of life, liberty, or property); Note, The Rule of 
Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561, 579 (1984) 
[hereinafter Note, Guarantee Clause] ("rule of law" should require reversal of state court deci-
sions that are a "clear mistake"); Amsterdam, Speech Before the Judicial Conference of the 
Second Circuit (Sept. 11, 1982), reprinted in Annual Judicial Conference - Second Judicial 
Circuit of the United States, 97 F.R.D. 545, 626. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHA-
PIRO & A. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM, 617-18 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER] (suggesting that the explicit 
announcement of a new statutory construction might provide more safeguards against "arbi-
trary" action than an unarticulated affirmance on few facts). 
For a more theoretical argument that state supreme courts can commit "errors," see 
Lempert, Error Behind the Plate and in the Law, 59 S. CALIF. L. REv. 407 (1986). These errors 
of state law may violate due process solely because they are errors. Interview with Richard 
Lempert, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Dec. l, 
1986). 
22. For the argument that Thompson supports federal court review of arbitrary state deci-
sions that lack evidence, see 16 c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4033, at 786-88 (1977) [hereinafter WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE]; Brilmayer, The Institutional and Empirical Basis of the Rights Thesis, 11 GA. L. REv. 
1173, 1179 n.19 (1977) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights Thesis]; Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 1043, 1057-58 (1977). 
For the argument that Lagan supports federal court review of arbitrary state decisions that 
deviate from state law, see Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 8-11; Rubin, supra 
note 21, at 1108 & n.308; Comment, Parratt v. Taylor: Don't Make a Federal Case out of It, 63 
B.U. L. REv. 1187, 1218-19 n.227 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Parratt v. Taylor]; The 
Supreme Court, 1981 Term -State Procedures and Remedies in Due Process Analysis, 96 HARV. 
L. REv. 96, 102-05 (1982); Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 625-26. 
For the argument that Hicks supports federal court review of arbitrary state decisions that 
deviate from state law, see Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 7-8; Amsterdam, 
supra note 21, at 625-26; see also Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and 
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 644 n.79 (1983) [hereinafter Westen, Meaning of 
Equality]. 
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Act cases, 23 equal protection cases, 24 death penalty cases, 25 the guar-
antee clause, 26 and the historical underpinnings of the due process 
clause.27 
In contrast, a number of courts of appeals have refused to interpret 
Thompson, Logan, and Hicks to support a rule against arbitrary state 
decisions. The First and Ninth Circuits have held that courts should 
not apply the Thompson no-evidence doctrine to civil decisions.28 In 
addition, the First Circuit has consistently held that Logan should not 
be interpreted to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions that 
deviate from state law.29 Finally, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have 
held that Hie~ should not be interpreted to support a rule against 
arbitrary state decisions, including state sentencing decisions, that de-
viate from state law.3o 
23. The AP A authorizes reviewing courts to set aside an agency action that is "in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) 
(1982). See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); 
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265·67 (1954). 
A number of commentators have argued that the requirement that federal agencies follow 
their own regulations is rooted in due process. See, e.g., Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind 
Regulators?, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 137, 149-50 (1967); Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 
21, at 21-24; Rubin, supra note 21, at 1134-36; Smolla, supra note 21, at 504-05. Relying on this 
theory, Amsterdam argues that the AP A cases support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. 
Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 624. 
For the argument that the requirement is rooted in congressional legislative power, rather 
than constitutional due process, see Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break 
Their Own ''.Laws," 64 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 6-13 (1985). See also Westen, The Meaning of Equal-
ity, supra note 22, at 644 n.79. At least two courts of appeals have rejected the argument that the 
AP A cases support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. See Atencio v. Board of Educ., 658 
F.2d 774, 778-79 (10th Cir. 1981); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 330, 330 n.7 (6th Cir. 1976). 
24. See generally Morgan, Playing by the Ru/es, supra note 21, at 8-9 n.42. 
25. See Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 13 n.56 (arguing that the role "the 
rule of law plays in our system is not limited to death penalty cases; the principle . , • underlies 
the basic concept of due process"). 
26. The guarantee clause provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion •••• " 
U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4. Two commentators, Rubin, supra note 21, at 1106 n.297, and Note, 
Guarantee Clause, supra note 21, argue that the guarantee clause imposes a rule against arbitrary 
state decisions on state decisionmakers. The Supreme Court has refused to adopt this interpreta-
tion. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) ("the States are 
free to allocate the law-making function to whatever branch of state government they may 
choose"); see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 n.4 (1980); Ohio ex. rel Bryant v. 
Akron Metro Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902). 
27. The due process clause of the fifth amendment is an enlargement of the "law of the land" 
clause in the Magna Carta. See Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897). See also Berger, supra 
note 23, at 149-50 ("[c]ompliance with a regulation ..• is required by due process in its primal 
sense; i.e., a regulation, like a statute, is part of the "law of the land" which must be observed"); 
Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 18-19. The Court has rejected the argument that 
the historical underpinnings of the due process clause require that states follow state law. See 
e.g .• J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 190 n.13 (1980) (criticizing Justice Black's "law of the 
land" requirement in In re Winship because "it would make every question of state law a federal 
question"). 
28. See note 186 infra and accompanying text. 
29. See notes 217-219 infra and accompanying text. 
30. See notes 231-32 infra and accompanying text. 
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This Note argues that the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks decisions 
should not be interpreted to support a rule against arbitrary state deci-
sions. Rather, federal courts should only review state court and 
agency actions that violate state law if the state action itself - without 
reference to state law - violates specific constitutional guarantees, 
such as procedural protections, equal protection prohibitions, or first 
amendment freedoms. A constitutional due process rule against arbi-
trary state decisions, which permits federal courts to become the ulti-
mate expositors of state law, conflicts with the fundamental tenets of 
federalism.31 In many cases, federal review of arbitrary state decisions 
may intrude upon the state decision-making processes. First, state de-
cisions that appear arbitrary to a federal court may in fact be valid 
formulations of state law. Likewise, a state decision that apparently 
conflicts with state law may have been a valid interpretation of state 
law. Additionally, a state decision that seems internally inconsistent 
may have relied on important tacit rationales or assumptions. Finally, 
federal court review of arbitrary state decisions interferes with the 
state decisionmaking process by denying the different branches of state 
government the opportunity to challenge a state decision that appears 
to conflict with state statutes, regulations, or precedent. 
Part I of this Note argues that the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks 
cases can be read narrowly to deal primarily with concern about pro-
tecting specific constitutional guarantees such as criminal procedural 
protections, equal protection guarantees, and first amendment free-
doms. Arguably, in order to avoid dealing explicitly with the broader 
constitutional questions raised by the state decisions, the Court re-
versed the state decisions as arbitrary interpretations of state law. Part 
II argues that the rule against arbitrary state decisions suggested by 
Thompson, Logan, and Hicks is incompatible with federalism because 
it interferes with states' ability to develop law over state law matters, 
to make final decisions over state law issues, and to divide law-making 
power between different branches of state government. Part III exam-
ines how broad applications of Thompson, Logan, and Hicks have in-
truded upon state power. In many of these cases, rather than 
constituting an arbitrary decision, the state decision could be equally 
well explained as a valid application or interpretation of state law. By 
reviewing the state decisionmaker's decision, federal courts have not 
only imposed their own interpretation of state law on the state, but 
have also interfered with the division of power between state 
decisionmakers. 
31. Many of the commentators who advocate a rule against arbitrary state decisions recog-
nize that the rule conflicts with federalism. For this reason, many of these commentators try to 
limit the scope of the rule to minimize its impact on federalism. See notes 151-53 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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I. DISTINGUISHING THOMPSON, LOGAN, AND HICKS: CONCERN 
ABOUT PROTECTING SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES 
Despite broad language about arbitrary state decisions, Thompson, 
Logan, and Hicks may have been primarily concerned with protecting 
other specific constitutional guarantees, such as criminal procedural 
protections, equal protection guarantees, and first amendment free-
doms. 32 The Court apparently relied on arbitrariness grounds to avoid 
addressing difficult questions about the scope of certain constitutional 
protections. For this reason, these cases need not be read to support a 
rule against arbitrary state decisions. Rather, these cases can be read 
narrowly as prophylactic rules that were only designed to protect spe-
cific constitutional freedoms. 
A. Thompson and Hicks as Criminal Procedure Cases 
In Thompson, the state's conviction implicated a number of crimi-
nal guarantees such as the presumption of innocence and the protec-
tion afforded by the ex post facto clause. In addition, the Court's 
analysis in a recent case, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional 
Institution v. Hill, 33 suggests that the Thompson no-evidence rule may 
apply only to state criminal decisions that constitute findings of mis-
conduct that impose the threat of prison confinement. Likewise, Hicks 
can be read narrowly as a criminal procedural case because it appears 
that the Court was primarily concerned with protecting Hicks' right to 
jury sentencing and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 
1. Thompson: Concern About Protecting Criminal Procedural 
Guarantees 
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 34 the Court reversed a state 
court decision solely for lack of evidence. 35 Sam Thompson was con-
victed by a city police court for loitering and disorderly conduct, and 
fined $10 for each charge. The record showed that Thompson, a long-
time resident of Louisville and frequent patron of the Liberty End 
Cafe, was in the cafe for half an hour, moving his feet in rhythm with 
the music of a jukebox. 36 Thompson testified that he had been waiting 
for a bus. Two police officers entered the cafe on a "routine check." 
One of the officers asked Thompson why he was there, and Thompson 
answered that he was waiting for a bus. The officer arrested 
32. This analysis of Thompson was suggested in discussions with Professors Christina 
Whitman and Peter Westen of the University of Michigan Law School. This analysis of Hicks 
was suggested in discussions with Professor Peter Westen. 
33. 472 U.S. 445 (1985). 
34. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
35. See generally Note, State Fact Findings, supra note 21, at 331-32 nn.20 & 25. 
36. 362 U.S. at 202. 
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Thompson for loitering and took him outside. The officer testified that 
Thompson "was very argumentative - he argued with us back and 
forth." He was therefore arrested and convicted for disorderly con-
duct and loitering. 37 Because the offense was minor, no appellate re-
view was available in the Kentucky courts.38 The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed. 
In reviewing the conviction, the Court said that it was attempting 
to determine whether there was a total lack of evidence, rather than 
undertaking a general inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence. 39 
After examining the elements of each charge against Thompson, it 
concluded that the record was "entirely lacking in evidence to support 
any of the charges" and that punishment "without evidence of guilt" 
violates due process.40 
Since 1960, the Court has applied the no-evidence doctrine to re-
verse seven state criminal convictions41 and one state probation revo-
cation decision.42 The doctrine no longer has significant application 
for review of criminal decisions because the Thompson doctrine has 
been displaced by Jackson v. Virginia. 43 Jackson established that, in 
addition to reviewing state convictions for total lack of evidence, fed-
eral courts may undertake a more extensive review for sufficiency of 
evidence. 44 The new standard, the Court stated, was designed to pro-
tect the principle articulated in In Re Winship: that due process re-
quires criminal convictions to be based upon a showing of guilt beyond 
a "reasonable doubt."45 While the Court explicitly limited Jackson 
37. 362 U.S. at 199-202. Thompson received only a $10 fine for each charge. However, he 
could have been subject to imprisonment or confinement in the workhouse if he failed to pay the 
fine. 362 U.S. at 201. 
38. 362 U.S. at 202 & n.4. 
39. 362 U.S. at 199; see also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1961). 
40. 362 U.S. at 204, 206. Examining the loitering charge, the Court found the evidence 
lacking. The Court said Thompson had accounted for himself when he said he was waiting for a 
bus, there was no evidence that he was loitering or loafing "in the ordinary sense of the words," 
and finally, the manager's failure to object to Thompson's presence was "implied consent, which 
the city admitted in oral argument satisfies the ordinance." 362 U.S. at 205. Examining the 
disorderly conduct charge, the Court said that the officer's statement that Thompson was "argu-
mentative" was not sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct. 362 U.S. at 206. 
41. Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (per curiam); Gregory v. City of Chi-
cago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968) (per curiam); Shuttlesworth 
v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (per curiam); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
42. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam). Buder rested alternatively on the 
Bouie ex post facto doctrine. Buder, 412 U.S. at 432 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347 (1964)). 
43. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
44. The Jackson Court stated that the new standard does not require a federal court to "ask 
itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," 
but only to consider whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S. at 318-19 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972). 
45. 443 U.S. at 313, 319 n.12. 
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review for sufficiency of evidence to criminal convictions, the Court 
never addressed the question of whether Thompson applies to civil de-
cisions. The Jackson Court only stated that the Thompson case 
presented "the stark problem of arbitrariness."46 
a. The criminal procedural guarantees in Thompson. The 
Thompson Court may have reversed Thompson's state court convic-
tion because it wanted to protect several of his constitutional criminal 
procedural rights.47 First, the Thompson decision protected Thomp-
son's due process right to a presumption of innocence in criminal 
cases. Second, the Court may have been concerned about Thompson's 
sixth amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation.48 Because the prosecution had presented no evidence to 
support an element of the crime, the defendant did not have notice 
that the element was an issue at the trial. Third, the Court may have 
been concerned that the state court's interpretation of the state law 
violated the ex post facto prohibition applicable to criminal decisions. 
The ex post facto clause, applicable to courts through the due process 
clause, 49 prohibits state court criminal decisions that interpret a nar-
rowly-drawn criminal statute in an "unforeseeable" manner.50 
46. 443 U.S. at 315. 
47. The Court explicitly used the Thompson doctrine as a means to protect specific criminal 
procedural guarantees in Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Jus-
tice). In Harris, Justice Douglas cited Thompson in reversing a federal district court judge's 
denial of bail. The Court relied on Thompson in order to protect eighth amendment guarantees. 
48. In defending against the loitering and disorderly conduct charges at trial, Thompson 
relied on a definition of these crimes that included certain specific elements. 362 U.S. at 204-06. 
By convicting Thompson without evidence of all of these elements, the state court apparently 
adopted a broader definition of the crime that did not include all the elements which Thompson 
believed were required. For this reason, Thompson did not know the elements of the charges 
that he should contest. The Court itself suggested that the no-evidence doctrine ensures proper 
notice of charges when it stated, "Just as '[c]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer 
denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without 
evidence of his guilt." 362 U.S. at 206 (footnote omitted) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 
353, 362 (1937)). 
The no-notice interpretation of Thompson is also supported by the statement in Jackson that 
the Thompson no-evidence doctrine is rooted in the right to a meaningful opportunity to defend 
oneself and the right to a trial. 443 U.S. at 314. See also Comment, Federal Review of the 
Evidence Supporting State Convictions: Jackson v. Virginia, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1588 & 
n.76 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Jackson v. Vi1X"inia] (discussing this interpretation of Thomp-
son). A number of commentators have criticized this explanation of Thompson. See WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at§ 4033; Tushnet, Constitutional Limitations of Substantive 
Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilber, 55 B.U. L. REV. 775, 
796-97 (1975); Note, No Evidence Required To Support a Conviction, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1137, 
1144 (1962) [hereinafter Note, No Evidence] (criticizing J. Harlan's no-notice interpretation of 
Thompson in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 190 (1961)). 
49. The ex post facto clause, on its face, applies only to legislative acts. See, e.g., Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). But the Court has held that the due process clause bars a 
state appellate court from doing what the ex post facto clause prohibits a legislature from doing. 
See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW,§ 2.4 (c) (2d ed. 1986). 
50. See Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam). In Buder, the Court relied on 
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Fourth, the no-evidence rule can be viewed as a guarantee of the sixth 
amendment right to a fair criminal trial, constructed similarly to the 
prohibition against statutory presumptions. The presumption doctrine 
protects the jury's role as factfinder by preventing it from reaching 
conclusions based on statutory presumptions without a logical eviden-
tiary basis for the presumption.51 Similarly, the no-evidence doctrine 
may simply declare that a defendant does not receive a fair trial when 
a judge or jury reaches a statutorily mandated conclusion that has no 
logical evidentiary basis.52 Finally, the Thompson court may have felt 
compelled to review the case because Thompson did not have a right 
to appeal the conviction. But even today, the Court has been unwill-
ing to declare a right of appeal for criminal or civil decisions. 53 
Thompson's conviction by the Kentucky state court implicated a 
number of his criminal procedural guarantees. By phrasing the 
Thompson decision in broad terms of arbitrariness, the Court managed 
to avoid explicitly addressing the scope of these criminal procedural 
guarantees. Viewed in this way, Thompson is limited to the protection 
of criminal procedural guarantees, and thus is inapplicable to non-
criminal state decisions. 54 
b. Limiting the no-evidence doctrine to criminal convictions and 
other findings of misconduct that impose the threat of prison confine-
Thompson and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), to reverse a state court revoca-
tion of probation. The state court revoked Douglas' probation for failing to report a traffic cita-
tion. The terms of that probation required that " '[a]ll arrests for any reason must be reported 
without delay to [petitioner's] probation and parole officer.'" 412 U.S. at 430. Examining the 
state statutes, the Court said that an "arrest" under Missouri and Arkansas law existed only 
when a person was subject to "actual restraint" or taken into "custody.'' 412 U.S. at 431-32. 
The Court concluded that the state's finding of an arrest violated due process because there was 
no evidence petitioner was subjected to an "actual restraint" or taken into "custody.'' 412 U.S. 
at 432 (citing Thompson). The Court rejected the argument that the state court had redefined 
"arrest" to include a traffic citation. 412 U.S. at 432. 
51. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 
52. Justice Douglas made this analogy between the Thompson no-evidence doctrine and the 
statutory presumption doctrine in his dissent to Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1972). 
Barnes upheld a statutory presumption that the unexplained possession of recently stolen mail is 
sufficient to enable a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the mail 
with knowledge it was stolen. Douglas argued in dissent that the statutory presumption violated 
the right to a fair trial. If Thompson means anything, he stated, it means that Congress may not 
"constitutionally enact a law that says juries can convict a defendant without any evidence at all 
from which an inference of guilt could be drawn.'' 412 U.S. at 850-51. See also Comment, 
Jackson v. Virginia, supra note 48, at 1588 n.74. 
53. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1536 (1987) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894)). But see Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 
1530 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "Texaco cannot, consistent with due process and 
equal protection, be arbitrarily denied the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on 
appeal"). 
54. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1283 
(9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply Thompson to a civil action); Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 
F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1982) (same). But cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 602 (arguing that the 
Court should ensure fair procedures just as vigorously in civil cases as in criminal cases). 
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ment. Recently, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional In-
stitution v. Hill, 55 the Court curiously applied a no-evidence rule 
identical to that in Thompson, yet failed to mention Thompson itself. 
The Court reviewed a state parole revocation decision to determine 
whether the decision was based on "some evidence."56 In dicta, the 
Hill Court indicated its willingness to extend the some-evidence doc-
trine to other state civil decisions if they affect "important liberty 
interest[s]."57 
Hill involved a state parole board's revocation of two inmates' 
good-time credits. 58 The inmates sued in state court but based their 
arguments on federal, not state, constitutional law.59 Instead, they 
successfully argued in the state supreme court that the state decision 
violated federal due process because it was not supported by "some 
evidence."60 The Supreme Court accepted the some-evidence stan-
dard as applicable to state parole revocation decisions, but it found 
that the state decision was, in fact, supported by some evidence. 61 
The implication of Hill is that the federal courts may review state 
court decisions affirming parole board revocation decisions to deter-
mine whether the parole decision was supported by some evidence. 62 
Furthermore, the Court suggested in dicta that the some-evidence rule 
applies to state court decisions other than those involved with the rev-
ocation of parole and probation: "In a variety of contexts, the Court 
SS. 472 U.S. 44S, 4SS (198S). 
S6. 472 U.S. at 4S4. Although the Court did not cite Thompson, the Hill some-evidence rule 
and the Thompson no-evidence rule appear indistinguishable. In support of the Hill somc-evi· 
dence rule, the Court cited Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam), which had 
relied upon the Thompson no-evidence rule to reverse a state probation revocation. A recent 
district court interpretation of Thompson and Hill supports the proposition that Thompson and 
Hill support a unitary no-evidence rule. See Brands v. Sheldon Community School, 671 F. Supp. 
627, 632 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (citing Thompson and Hill in upholding a high school disciplinary 
action and stating that such decisions require "some evidence"). 
S7. 472 U.S. at 4SS. 
SS. Hill v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 392 Mass. 198, 466 N.E.2d 818 (1984), 
revd, 472 U.S. 44S (198S). 
S9. Hill, 392 Mass. at 199 n.2, 466 N.E.2d at 819 n.2; Hill, 472 U.S. at 448, 457. Under state 
law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had discretionary power to review state parole 
board decisions to determine whether they were supported by "reliable evidence," as required by 
state regulations. Hill, 472 U.S. at 4Sl-S3. 
60. Hill, 392 Mass. at 200-01, 466 N.E.2d at 821. 
61. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-S7. 
62. Note, The Written Statement Requirement of Wolff v. McDonnell: An Argument for 
Factual Specificity, SS FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 943 n.6 (1987). The Hill some-evidence doctrine 
has also been applied to a variety of prison disciplinary actions, most frequently in cases in which 
the prison board's decision was based on the uncorroborated hearsay statements of confidential 
informants, see, e.g., Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1987) (such statements may not 
be sufficient); Mendoza v. Miller, 770 F.2d 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 198S), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1142 (1986) (such statements may not be sufficient); or when the prison board decision was based 
on urinalysis test results, see, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 7S3, 756 (8th Cir. 1986) (such tests 
may be sufficient); Pella v. Adams, 638 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1986) (such tests may not be 
sufficient). 
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has recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an 
important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not 
supported by any evidence."63 At the same time, the Court cautioned 
that federal courts should not use the some-evidence requirement to 
"second-guess" state factual findings.64 
In deciding to apply the some-evidence rule to state parole revoca-
tion decisions, the Hill Court relied on the three-prong balancing test 
of Mathews v. Eldridge. 65 In procedural due process cases, the 
Supreme Court has used the Mathews test to determine the types of 
procedural protections required when the government deprives an in-
dividual of a liberty or property interest. 66 The Mathews test considers 
three factors: (1) th~ private interest affected by the state action; 
(2) the governmental interest affected by requiring the procedural safe-
guard; and (3) the value of the additional procedural safeguard. 67 Ap-
plying this balancing test analysis in Hill, the Court held that the 
imposition of the some-evidence rule to other types of state civil deci-
sions will depend on a balancing of the private and governmental in-
terests affected in each case. 68 The Hill Court emphasized the 
individual's important liberty interest in "freedom from confinement," 
adding that the rule would not impose significant burdens on parole 
proceedings. 69 
Although the dicta in Hill suggest that the no-evidence doctrine 
may extend to civil cases other than parole and probation revocation 
decisions, Hill should be read narrowly. The Court's holding simply 
reaffirmed the Buder rule that the no-evidence doctrine applies to pa-
role and probation revocation decisions as well as criminal decisions.70 
In addition, the Court indicated its reluctance to "second-guess" state 
factual findings, concluding that the evidence at issue satisfied the 
. some-evidence requirement. 71 Furthermore, the very dicta suggesting 
the no-evidence rule might apply to other types of state court decisions 
that affect "important liberty interests" contain references to Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 72 and United States ex rel Vajtauer v. 
63. Hi//, 472 U.S. at 455. 
64. 472 U.S. at 455. 
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1975). 
66. See generally Rubin, supra note 21, at 1136-44. 
67. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
68. Hill, 472 U.S.· at 454. 
69. 472 U.S. at 455. 
70. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam). The Court cited Buder to support 
the proposition that the some-evidence rule might apply in other contexts. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. 
The Court has established that parole and probation decisions deserve the same procedural due 
process protection. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973). 
71. Hi//, 472 U.S. at 455. 
72. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Schware reversed a state bar's denial of admission to a former 
member of the Communist Party because there was "no evidence in the record which rationally 
justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law." 353 U.S. at 246-47. It seems 
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Commissioner of Immigration, 73 which arguably undertook extensive 
evidentiary review only to protect first amendment freedoms. 
The limitation of the no-evidence rule to parole and probation rev-
ocation decisions is equally evident from the Court's application of the 
Mathews balancing test. Although parole and probation revocation 
decisions are not technically part of criminal proceedings, 74 these deci-
sions constitute findings of misconduct that affect more important lib-
erty interests than do other civil decisions.75 Accordingly, the no-
evidence rule should only be applied where the state decision imposes 
the threat of prison confinement for criminal convictions and discipli-
nary actions. 
This narrow reading of the Thompson-Hill doctrine is buttressed 
by Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing. 76 Ewing claimed that his dismissal from the Uni-
versity's six-year undergraduate/medical school program, allegedly 
unsupported by evidence, constituted a violation of his right to due 
process.77 In their amicus brief, the National Education Association 
and the American Federation of Teachers argued that Thompson and 
Hill supported the proposition that the deprivation of any liberty or 
property interest without evidence violates due process. 78 The major-
likely the Court undertook extensive review of the evidence to protect Schware's first amendment 
freedoms. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 970 (2d ed. 
1983). 
73. 273 U.S. 103 (1927). The Court's review of the evidence in Vajtauer also may have been 
motivated by a concern for first amendment freedoms. Vajtauer was deported because of his 
Communist activities. The Court stated that "[t]he ultimate question presented by this record 
... is whether the warrant of deportation was supported by any evidence that the alien when he 
entered the United States advocated opposition to all organized government or the overthrow of 
the United States government by force and violence, within the meaning of the statute." 273 
U.S. at 106. In addition, the Vajtauer Court was reviewing a federal agency decision to deter-
mine whether the agency action complied with federal law, rather than reviewing a state decision 
on arbitrariness grounds. See generally Rubin, supra note 21, at 1048 & n.40, 1058-59 & nn.71-
72 (discussing the due process implications of Schware and Vajtauer). 
74. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1972). 
75. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 482, ("[T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeter-
minate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 
'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others."). A number of Court decisions have granted 
greater due process protection for state probation and parole decisions than for other state enti-
tlement denial decisions. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671-72 (1983) (state must 
consider alternatives before revoking probation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781-82 (proba-
tioners and parolees are entitled to both a preliminary and a final hearing); Douglas v. Buder, 412 
U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam) (Bouie ex post facto rule only applies to criminal convictions 
and probation and parole revocation decisions, but not other civil decisions); Prater v. United 
States Parole Commn., 802 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). 
76. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). See generally Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 994 (1986). 
77. 474 U.S. at 217-19. 
78. Brief for the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-10, Regents of the Univ. of 
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (No. 84-1273) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Ewing]. 
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ity opinion, however, avoided the due process issue. Even if Ewing 
had such a right, the majority stated, the University's action was sup-
ported by the evidence. 79 In addition, the Court expressed its reluc-
tance to "trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational 
institutions. " 80 
Justice Powell squarely addressed the due process' issue in his con-
currence. He argued that Ewing did not have a substantive due pro-
cess right to be free from state action taken without evidentiary 
support. Due process, Powell argued, requires the state to provide 
only procedural protections when the state deprives a person of a state-
created property interest. 81 Substantive due process rules, Powell ar-
gued, should only apply when the state infringes upon "fundamental 
interests" which historically have been "viewed as implicitly protected 
by the Constitution."82 Under Powell's analysis, state actions that vio-
late state law do not violate due process if they interfere with liberty 
interests that are merely "important." Rather, such state actions vio-
late due process only if they interfere with historically recognized 
"fundamental liberty interests." Powell's analysis suggests that the 
Thompson no-evidence doctrine should be limited at least to criminal 
convictions, parole/probation revocation decisions, and prison disci-
plinary actions. These decisions, which constitute findings of miscon-
duct that impose the sanction of prison confinement, implicate 
historically recognized fundamental liberty interests not implicated by 
state civil decisions. 83 In this way, the no-evidence doctrine may be 
viewed as a criminal procedural right only applicable to criminal con-
victions and other disciplinary decisions that impose the threat of 
prison confinement. 
2. Hicks as a Criminal Procedure Case 
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, the Court again appears to have applied a 
rule against arbitrary state decisions to protect criminal procedural 
rights. 84 Defendant Hicks was tried and convicted for distributing 
heroin. Because he had two previous felony convictions, the jury had 
been instructed to sentence him to forty years' imprisonment based on 
the habitual offender statute then in effect. After Hicks' conviction, 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unrelated case, invali-
dated the recidivist provision as unconstitutionally vague. 85 On his 
79. 474 U.S. at 223. 
80. 474 U.S. at 226. 
81. 474 U.S. at 229-30 (Powell, J., concurring). 
82. 474 U.S. at 229-30. 
83. See note 75 supra; note 186 infra. 
84. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). The following analysis of Hicks was, in part, suggested by Professor 
Peter Westen of the University of Michigan Law School. 
85. Thigpen v. State, 571 P.2d 467, 471 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). 
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subsequent appeal to that court, Hicks asked to have his forty-year 
sentence set aside. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that 
the statute was unconstitutional but affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence nonetheless. The court reasoned that Hicks was not prejudiced 
by the impact of the invalid statute, since his sentence was within the 
range of punishment that could have been imposed in any event. 86 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court applied its familiar two-step due 
process entitlement analysis. This test requires that a reviewing fed-
eral court first examine the relevant state law to determine whether a 
person had a "property" or "liberty" interest under that law. 87 This 
determination will normally depend on the state's statutory, regula-
tory, and judicial pronouncements. 88 Second, the court must deter-
mine whether the agency deprived the person of his or her "property" 
or "liberty" interest without due process. To determine the amount of 
procedure that is "due," the Court will employ the three-tiered analy-
sis of Mathews v. Eldridge. 89 
The most difficult part of the analysis is determining whether the 
state had created a "property" or "liberty" interest in the first place. 
In the typical case, after a state agency revokes a benefit, the aggrieved 
party goes immediately before federal district court, alleging a depri-
vation of constitutional rights under section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act.90 To determine whether the party had an entitlement under state 
law, the federal court usually focuses on the state statute's language.91 
86. Hicks v. State, No. F-77-751 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 1979), quoted in Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. at 345 n.2. 
87 .. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). 
88. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 576-77 (1972). See generally Smolla, supra note 21, at 473. 
89. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text. 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), established that 
state remedies need not be exhausted before a plaintiff may seek relief under section 1983. At the 
same time, the Court has held that a federal court should "stay its hand" when there is reason to 
believe that state judicial remedies would still be available. Mabry v. Klimas, 448 U.S. 444, 447 
(1980). 
91. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 428 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) ("Our cases leave no doubt that where a statute indicates with 'language of an unmis-
takable mandatory character,' that state conduct injurious to an individual will not occur 'absent 
specified substantive predicates,' the statute creates an expectation protected by the Due Process 
Clause.") (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) ("whether ... [a] state statute pro-
vides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis" in view of each statute's 
"unique structure and language"); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985). 
When the question is one ofliberty rather than property, the Court has occasionally derived a 
constitutional liberty interest without reference to the state statute. See Vitek v. ·Jones, 445 U.S. 
480, 491-94 (1980) (holding that, independent of a state statute regulating the transfer of prison-
ers to mental hospitals, such a transfer implicates liberty interests); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 673 (1977) (right to be free from intrusions on personal security created by fourteenth 
amendment). In other prisoners' rights cases, the Court has held that no constitutional liberty 
interest was implicated. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 466-67; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 
238 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
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If the state supreme court has ruled on the existence-of-entitlement 
issue in the case at hand or in other similar cases, the Court has usu-
ally deferred to these rulings as authoritative statements of state law.92 
Applying this two-part due process analysis in Hicks, the Court 
first found that Hicks had a liberty interest. This liberty interest arose 
from Hicks' "substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be de-
prived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the 
exercise of its statutory discretion . . . ."93 The Court stated that 
Hicks was "entitled under state law" to a different jury sentence. 
While Hicks had been sentenced under the recidivist statute, which 
required a forty-year mandatory sentence, the "correct" statute would 
have allowed the jury to impose a sentence of a minimum of ten years' 
imprisonment.94 · 
The Court next held that the state had deprived Hicks of this lib-
erty interest without due process.95 Even if the state court had the 
right to modify his sentence, its consideration of Hicks' claim did not 
provide him with adequate procedural protection, the Court said, be-
cause the appellate court did not "purport to cure the deprivation by 
itself reconsidering the appropriateness of the petitioner's 40-year sen-
tence."96 The Supreme Court deemed "arbitrary" the state court's 
"frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally as 
harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender provision."97 
The Court's reasoning in Hicks diverges from the facts. The Court 
said that the liberty interest was based on the statute. But, at the time 
92. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244 n.5, 249-50 (1983); cf Mabry v. Limas, 448 
U.S. 444, 447 (1979) (federal courts should defer hearing a habeas corpus action until the state 
courts have ruled on the issue, particularly when the claim arises from an alleged deprivation by 
state courts of rights created under state law); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976) 
(deferring to the District Court's interpretation of state law in the absence of a state supreme 
court ruling on the issue). See generally Monaghan, Of ''Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL 
L. REV. 405, 439-42 (1977) (criticizing the Court's approach); Rubin, supra note 21, at 1091-92; 
Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 146, 182-83 (1983) (commenting on Monaghan). 
93. 447 U.S. at 346-47. 
94. 447 U.S. at 346. 
95. 447 U.S. at 346. 
96. 447 U.S. at 347. The Court also rejected the argument that the appellate court had the 
discretion to increase the sentence on appeal, even if the trial court had applied the wrong stat-
ute. Oklahoma Statute title 22, section 1066 (1971) gave Oklahoma appellate courts the power to 
"reverse, affirm or modify the judgment appealed from." 447 U.S. at 347. To justify its reluc-
tance to accept the state court's interpretation of state law, the Court noted that the state's 
assistant attorney general had stated in oral argument that "it was doubtful whether the appellate 
court had power" under state law to increase a sentence on appeal. 447 U.S. at 347. Despite the 
Court's suggestion in Hicks that the Oklahoma state appellate courts did not have discretion to 
modify lower court sentences, the Oklahoma appellate court later reaffirmed its right to modify 
sentences. Livingston v. State, 614 P.2d 1118 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1102 (1981). 
97. 447 U.S. at 346. On remand, Hicks' sentence was modified to the minimum possible 
under the valid section of the statute. Hicks v. State, No. F-77-751 (Okla. Jan. 15, 1981) (on 
remand) reported in Nipps. v. State, 626 P.2d 1349, 1350 & n.4 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981). 
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Hicks was sentenced, the then-valid statute dictated that the jury im-
pose a mandatory forty-year sentence. It is incorrect to say that Hicks 
had an expectation that he would be sentenced under any other stat-
ute. It is true that the Oklahoma appellate court later declared the 
statute under which Hicks had been sentenced unconstitutional. But 
the court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its earlier decision, 98 
even to a case pending on appeal when the decision was made, was 
consistent with established principles of retroactivity.99 In fact, the 
appellate court had declared the habitual offender statute unconstitu-
tional because the statute mandated sentences that were too lenient on 
a defendant with two prior convictions (like Hicks).100 
Although the Court explicitly relied on procedural due process 
cases, 101 Hicks cannot be squared with traditional procedural due pro-
cess analysis. Hicks was not a case in which a state agency or court 
denied an entitlement without procedural due process. Rather, the 
state appellate court decided as an initial matter that state law did not 
give Hicks a substantive right to be resentenced by a jury under the 
jury sentence statute. 102 Although allowing the jury to resentence 
Hicks under this statute might have resulted in a different sentence, 
Hicks nevertheless received procedural due process because he had full 
opportunity to argue in the appellate court that the court should have 
applied this statute to remand the case for jury resentencing.1o3 
Despite its broad due process language, Hicks should not be read 
98. The Supreme Court has long held that a state court has discretion whether to give retro· 
spective effect to a new constitutional rule or statutory interpretation. See Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Great Northern Ry v. 
Sunburst Oil & Ref., 287 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1932) (state court's decision to give retrospective 
effect to new rules depends on "the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their concep· 
tions of law, its origin and nature"). 
In United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), the Court modified the rule of retroactivity 
for the announcement of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The Court said courts 
can only refuse to apply a new constitutional rule on criminal procedure to cases pending on 
appeal if the rule was a "clear break" from the past. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 
(1987), the Court again modified the rule, saying that courts could not refuse to apply a new 
constitutional rule to cases pending review. Hicks falls within this range of cases. 
99. In Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 430 (D. Utah 1984), ajfd., 802 F.2d 1256 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (death penalty case) the defendant argued that Hicks supported the proposition that 
state courts must retroactively apply newly announced state constitutional rulings. The district 
and appellate courts refused to read Hicks so broadly. The district court rejected the argument, 
saying that the state court's decision was not "arbitrary" nor "based on mere conjecture," but 
rather "based on a rational application of established principles of retroactivity." The Court of 
Appeals rejected the argument on slightly different grounds. The court found Hicks inapposite 
because the state court had decided the defendant did not have a state-created entitlement. The 
court indicated it was not proper for it to review the state court's decision. 802 F.2d at 1271 
n.13. 
100. Thigpen v. State, 571 P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). See also Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent, 447 U.S. at 351 (analyzing the case in equal protection terms and stating that Hicks "was 
a member of the favored class"). 
101. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346. 
102. See 447 U.S. at 347. 
103. Contra 447 U.S. at 346-47. 
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to stand for the proposition that any state court decision that "arbi-
trarily" deviates from a state statute or prior state court holding vio-
lates due process. The Court may have been motivated by a concern 
that Hicks received a judge-determined sentence rather than a jury 
sentence. The Court expressed its concern that the state court had 
taken away Hicks' statutorily-created right to jury sentencing on the 
"frail conjecture" that a judge could decide an alternative sentence 
that was consistent with a jury sentence.104 The right to jury sentenc-
ing, the Court implied, was more than a mere statutory right. Rather, 
it was a constitutional right that the state could not take away, at least 
not without a good reason. Furthermore, the Court may have been 
concerned that Hicks' forty-year sentence for the sale of heroin with 
two prior convictions violated the eighth amendment protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment because it was excessive.105 By 
relying on the rule against arbitrary decisions, the Court was able to 
reverse the state court decision without explicitly addressing the 
broader constitutional issues concerning the eighth amendment and 
jury sentencing.106 
In both Thompson and Hicks the defendant challenged state 
actions that raised important questions about the scope of certain 
criminal guarantees, such as the right to an appeal or the right to jury 
sentencing. In both cases the Court managed to provide the defendant 
with relief without explicitly addressing these issues. Instead, the 
Court relied on broad language condemning arbitrary state decisions. 
Because it appears the Court was primarily concerned with securing 
criminal procedural protections, these cases should not be interpreted 
to support a broad rule against arbitrary state decisions. 
104. Hicks, 441 U.S. at 346-47. The state appellate court emphasized that because the pun-
ishment imposed was within the range of punishment authorized by Oklahoma law, the defen-
dant was not prejudiced by the use of the habitual offender statute. Hicks v. State, No. F-77-751 
(Mar. 8, 1979) (quoted in Hicks, 441 U.S. at 345 n.2). 
105. See Brief of Petitioner, at 69, n.30, Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (No. 78-
6885) (arguing that "this particular sentence under this statute is 'excessive' ... because the 
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and because it was 
imposed in a feckless and arbitrary way"). The standard for deciding whether punishment vio-
lates the eighth amendment because it is excessive was outlined by the Court in Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty case). The Court later applied these principles to a 
noncapital case. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (5-4 decision) (invalidating on eighth 
amendment grounds a life imprisonment sentence imposed under a recidivist statute triggered by 
a seventh nonviolent felony conviction). 
106. The Court in other cases has explicitly rejected the argument that the sixth amendment 
guarantees the right to jury sentencing. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (no 
constitutional right to jury sentencing in capital cases); United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977) (no sixth amendment right to have jury fix one's 
punishment). 
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B. Thompson and Logan: Concern About Protecting 
Constitutionally Protected Activity 
A second framework for distinguishing the cases that seem to cre-
ate a general rule against arbitrary state decisions focuses on the 
Court's concern for constitutionally protected activity. In Thompson 
and Logan, for example, it appears the Court was primarily concerned 
with preserving conduct protected by the first ainendment and the 
equal protection clause yet chose to avoid the constitutional issues by 
phrasing its decision in terms of arbitrariness. 
1. Thompson as a First Amendment and Equal Protection Case 
In Thompson, the conviction for loitering and disorderly conduct 
constituted a decision that state law prohibited Thompson's conduct. 
This interpretation of state law may have violated Thompson's first 
amendment rights by convicting him for merely arguing. 107 In addi-
tion, the court may have violated his fundamental right to freedom of 
movement by punishing him for shuffiing his feet.1os 
In almost every subsequent Supreme Court case applying 
Thompson to a state decision, the Court has used the no-evidence doc-
trine as a prophylactic rule to protect first amendment and equal pro-
tection rights implicated by the state decision at issue.109 In four cases 
involving segregation practices, the Court used the Thompson doctrine 
to protect first amendment and equal protection values. First, in Gar-
ner v. Louisiana, 110 the Court reversed the "disturbing the peace" con-
victions of blacks who had conducted "sit-ins" at segregated lunch 
107. A number of commentators have argued that the Court may have intended "no evi-
dence to support a conviction" to mean "no evidence to support a conviction for constitutionally 
punishable conduct." See Tushnet, supra note 48, at 795-96; Wechsler, supra note 22, at 1058; 
Comment, Recent Decisions - Conviction Without Evidence, 58 MICH. L. REV. 306, 307 (1962) 
[hereinafter Comment, Conviction Without Evidence];' Note, No Evidence, supra note 48, at 1145· 
46. 
108. The Court later recognized the fundamental right to "walk and stroll" in Papachristou 
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971). 
109. Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit has suggested that the Court has used the no·evidence 
doctrine to reverse convictions when the lack of evidence showed that the arrest and prosecution 
were racially motivated. In Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, J., dissent· 
ing), he explained: 
[A]n utter absence of evidence to support a criminal charge becomes of critical significance 
to a determination of whether or not the arrest and prosecution are racially motivated .... It 
is no mere coincidence that Negroes have figured prominently in many of those cases in 
which the Supreme Court has reversed State convictions grounded on evidence so insuffi-
cient as to constitute a denial of due process of law. 
455 F.2d at 46 (citing Thompson, Garner, Taylor, Bouie, Barr, Johnson, and Palmer). Douglas v. 
Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing a probation revocation) is the only Thompson 
case that does not appear to implicate first amendment or equal protection concerns. But the 
Buder case may be viewed as an ex post facto case. The Court explicitly recognized its ex post 
facto concerns in the decision which rested on alternative grounds. For a discussion of Buder, 
see note 50 supra. 
110. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
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counters. Second, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 111 the Court again eschewed 
a constitutional decision and instead relied on the no-evidence doc-
trine to reverse breach-of-the-peace convictions of four blacks sitting 
in a "white" bus depot waiting room. Third, in Barr v. City of 
Columbia, 112 the Court reversed the criminal trespass convictions of 
five black sit-in demonstrators who refused to leave "white" lunch 
counters. And finally, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 113 the 
Court relied on Thompson to reverse the conviction of a black ci:vil 
rights leader charged with loitering and refusing to obey the police 
while he was engaged in a civil rights boycott. In all four cases, it 
appears that the Court refused to accept the state court's interpreta-
tions of the state laws at issue primarily because the Court was unwill-
ing to address fully the broader first amendment and equal protection 
issues implicated by the state actions. 114 
The Court's reliance on Thompson in Johnson v. Florida, 115 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 116 and Vachon v. New Hampshire 117 may 
also be explained as attempts to secure constitutional protection of the 
activities in question. In Johnson, the state's actions interfered with 
the defendant's right to freedom of movement. 118 In Gregory and 
Vachon, the states' actions implicated first amendment freedoms. 
111. 370 U.S. 154 (1962). 
112. 378 U.S. 146 (1964). 
113. 382 U.S. 87 (1965). The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the police-
man's order for Shuttlesworth to move was given to help direct traffic. 382 U.S. at 95. The 
Court rejected Justice Fortas's argument that "[a]ny attempt to punish Shuttlesworth in these 
circumstances would, in my view, violate the Fourteenth Amendment." 382 U.S. at 102 (Fortas, 
J., concurring). 
114. Jack Greenberg, in a tribute to Charles L. Black, Jr., who argued Bouie and Barr before 
the Supreme Court, described the Court's reluctance to rule on the broader equal protection 
issue: 
The big new issues of that period arose out of the sit-ins, freedom rides, and demonstrations 
of Martin Luther King, Jr., whom LDF (NAACP Legal Defense Fund) represented. Fore-
most among those issues was determining what constituted state action under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The Supreme Court went to great 
lengths not to decide the constitutional issue - probably out of uncertainty over what the 
implications of such a decision might be. Instead, the Court decided the demonstration 
cases on a variety of nonconstitutional statutory and evidentiary grounds. Greenberg, 
Charles L. Black, Jr., 95 YALE L.J. 1559, 1560 (1986). 
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Court had less difficulty reversing similar convic-
tions by relying explicitly on the Act. In Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308 (1965), 
the Court held that the Civil Rights Act "removes peaceful attempts to be served on an equal 
basis from the category of punishable activities." 
115. 391 U.S. 596 (1968) (per curiam). 
116. 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
117. 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (per curiam). 
118. The Court in Johnson relied on Thompson to reverse a vagrancy conviction. The va-
grancy statute required a finding that a person was "wandering or strolling." 391 U.S. at 596. 
The Court may have relied on the Thompson doctrine in Johnson because it was unwilling at that 
time to declare a broader constitutional right to freedom of movement later outlined in two 
vagrancy cases, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); Ko/ender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
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Gregory reversed the disorderly conduct convictions of a group of 
marchers. 119 Vachon reversed the conviction of a store owner for 
"willfully" contributing to the delinquency of a minor by selling a but-
ton inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation" to a fourteen-year-old 
girl.120 
In almost every Thompson no-evidence case, the Court used the 
Thompson doctrine to enforce constitutional protection of activities 
threatened by the state action at issue. Because Thompson is properly 
viewed as a doctrine designed to secure such constitutional protection, 
it need not be applied to state decisions that do not implicate the exer-
cise of constitutional rights. 
2. Logan: Concern About Protecting Equal Protection Values 
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., plaintiff Logan filed suit 
against his employer with the Illinois Fair Practices Commission, al-
leging unlawful termination because of his physical handicap. 121 The 
Illinois statute required the Commission to convene a factfinding con-
ference within 120 days after the complaint was filed. 122 The Commis-
sion's representative, however, scheduled the factfinding conference 
five days after the expiration of the 120-day period. When the confer-
119. 394 U.S. 111 (1969). The Court stated that the defendants' march, if peaceful and 
orderly, was clearly protected by the first amendment. Still, it ruled on no-evidence grounds, 
saying there was no evidence of disorderly conduct. 394 U.S. at 112. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 784 n.15 (arguing that the case could have been decided on first 
amendment grounds). 
120. 414 U.S. 478 (1974). The Court concluded that New Hampshire law required the state 
to prove that the accused knew the girl was a minor, and that he personally sold her the button 
or personally caused another to sell it to her. 414 U.S. at 478-79. But the evidence, based solely 
on the girl's testimony, only showed that the girl bought the button from "some person" in the 
store. (The store owner conceded he "controlled the premises" on that date.) The Court con-
cluded that there was "no evidence" the defendant sold the button, knew it had been sold to a 
minor, authorized sales to minors, or was even in the store at the time of the sale. 414 U.S. at 
480. The Court rejected the argument that the state supreme court had reinterpreted the "will-
fully" requirement in the statute by affirming the conviction. The Court reversed on no-evidence 
grounds apparently because the Court was unwilling to declare a new constitutional rule of ob-
scene speech, even though a strong argument can be made that the conviction violated the first 
amendment as it had been interpreted at that time. See Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain-
Error Rule, 71 GEO. L.J. 945, 949-50 & n.34 (1983); Tushnet, supra note 48, at 798 n.174. 
Another explanation of Vachon is that the Court was seeking to protect a criminal procedural 
guarantee of a mens rea finding. Two commentators have argued that the Court in Vachon 
reversed the conviction because the state had created strict criminal liability by eliminating the 
mens rea element from the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See Tushnet, 
supra note 48, at 797-98; Comment, Jackson v. Virginia, supra note 48, at 1588 n.74. 
121. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 
48, §§ 851-867 (1979), repealed and replaced by Illinois Human Rights Act, Pub. Act No. 81-
1216, § 10-108, 1979 Ill. Laws 4854, 4892-93, prohibited employment discrimination against the 
handicapped and created the commission to investigate and adjudicate claims of such 
discrimination. 
122. At the factfinding conference, if the Commission found "substantial evidence" of illegal 
conduct, it was to try to reach conciliation, or, if that proved impossible, issue a formal com-
plaint against the employer. FEPA §§ 858-858.01. 
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ence date arrived, the employer moved to dismiss the charge, but the 
Commission rejected the request. The employer petitioned the Illinois 
Supreme Court to stay the Commission proceeding. The court held 
that the statute's time deadline deprived the Commission of jurisdic-
tion to hear Logan's claim. 123 Logan appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, claiming, among other things, that the state decision violated 
due process because it was arbitrary. 
The Supreme Court began its decision by employing the traditional 
two-part entitlement analysis.124 First, the Court decided that Logan 
had a property interest consisting of a right to bring a claim under the 
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act.125 Next, the Court held that 
Logan did not receive procedural due process before he was deprived 
of his property interest.126 
At this point, the Court's reasoning is unclear. In the initial part 
of the decision, the Court indicated that Logan's property interest was 
his right to bring a claim.127 Therefore, procedural due process would 
require only that Logan be given a hearing to determine whether he 
had this right. In fact, Logan was afforded a hearing in the Illinois 
Supreme Court. Yet later the Court suggested that Logan had a prop-
erty right to afavorable decision that would vindicate his "right to be 
free from discriminatory treatment."128 Thus, the Court held that 
procedural due process entitled Logan to a hearing on the merits of the 
claim (the procedure due) before the Commission decided to refuse his 
123. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on a previous decision and noted the statute's policy 
concern for facilitating the "just and expeditious resolutions of employment disputes," while 
protecting employers "from unfounded charges of discrimination." Logan, 455 U.S. at 427 
(quoting Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Commn., 82 Ill. 2d 99, 107, 106, 
4 N.E.2d 277, 282, 281 (1980)). The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected Logan's argument that 
his due process and equal protection rights would be violated by allowing the Commission's error 
to extinguish his cause of action. The state legislature had established the right to petition for 
redress for discriminatory employment practices, the court said, and "[t]he legislature could es-
tablish reasonable procedures to be followed upon a charge." Logan, 455 U.S. at 427 (quoting 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 82 Ill. 2d at 108, 411 N.E.2d at 282). The court also ruled that Logan 
could not file a second charge with the Commission based on the same act of alleged discrimina-
tion, because this would circumvent the design of the statute and frustrate the public interest in 
expeditious resolution of disputes. Logan, 455 U.S. at 428 (citing Zimmerman Brush Co., 82 Ill. 
2d at 108-09, 411 N.E.2d at 282-83). 
124. See generally notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text. 
125. This "property" interest was described as a "cause of action," 455 U.S. at 428, and "the 
right to use the FEPA's adjudicatory procedures." 455 U.S. at 431. 
The Court acknowledged that state courts have the right to impose procedural limits on the 
right to an adjudication, including statutes oflimitation, immunities defenses, and filing fees. 455 
U.S. at 432-33, 437. 
126. 455 U.S. at 430-34. 
127. 455 U.S. at 428. 
128. 455 U.S. at 437. Earlier, the Court referred to the property interest as "a state-created 
right to redress discrimination." 455 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). See Comment, Parratt v. 
Taylor, supra note 22, at 1218-19 n.227; Note, Parratt v. Taylor Revisited, 65 B.U. L. REV. 607, 
631-34 (1985). 
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right to redress his discrimination (the deprivation). 129 What the 
Court at first had deemed the property interest (the right to bring a 
claim) now became the procedure (the right to be heard on the merits) 
constitutionally necessary before the state could reject his claim on the 
merits. 130 Thus, Logan had the right to a hearing on the merits before 
the state refused to redress the discrimination. 
The Court's willingness to disregard the state court's holding on 
the existence of a state-created entitlement (the right to bring a claim) 
may have been motivated by its concern over employment discrimina-
tion.131 The Court appears to be tacitly saying that Logan had a con-
stitutional right to be free from discrimination. If this right were at 
stake, the Court could have reviewed the state procedural rules that 
blocked Logan from bringing a constitutional claim under the inade-
quate state ground doctrine. 132 However, by silently changing the na-
ture of the property interest while remaining within the traditional due 
process analysis, the Court was able to protect Logan's right to be free 
from discrimination without announcing a new constitutional doctrine 
concerning discrimination. 
In Thompson and Logan it appears that the Court relied on the 
rule against arbitrary decisions to avoid explicitly addressing the scope 
of specific constitutional freedoms implicated by the state action. A 
number of courts of appeals have also adopted the Thompson and 
Logan rules against arbitrary decisions as a prophylactic means to re-
view state decisions that implicated specific constitutional guarantees. 
In Spruytte v. Walters, 133 Barnett v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 134 
129. 455 U.S. at 433-34. 
130. See Rubin, supra note 21, at 1088 (calling Logan a "convoluted" opinion). 
131. See w. LOCKHART, J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & s. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(6th ed. 1986) 613 n.105 (noting that "the Court never told us why it was disregarding the state 
court's construction of the state's statute"); Smolla, supra note 21, at 500 n.175. The Logan 
Court also noted that it was concerned with protecting a "fundamental interest." 455 U.S. at 430 
n.5. See, also Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that the 
Court's decision in Logan was motivated in part by the Court's concern about "Logan's right to 
be free from discriminatory treatment"). 
132. The inadequate state ground doctrine, as formulated in a number of Court cases, pro-
vides that state procedural grounds may be deemed "inadequate" when (1) they are "plainly 
untenable," "novel," or "an arid ritual of meaningless form"; (2) they lack fair or substantial 
support in state law; or (3) they place unreasonable obstacles to assertion of federal rights. See, 
e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). See generally WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at§ 4027; Spann, supra note 119, at 970-71. 
133. 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The court relied 
on Thompson and Logan in finding that a prison's refusal to allow a prisoner to receive a diction-
ary violated substantive due process where the refusal violated state administrative rules. The 
court made a brief reference to the prisoner's first amendment right to receive a dictionary. 753 
F.2d at 501-02. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. 
134. 707 F.2d 1571, 1575, 1577-78 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1983). The court adopted a rule against 
arbitrary decisions, citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975), which reversed a lower 
federal court Thompson decision. The Barnette court held that a state job termination in viola-
tion of state rules may violate substantive due process. The record indicated that the plaintiff 
was fired because one of her bosses was angry that a member of the plaintiff's staff talked to the 
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and Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 135 the state decisions impli-
cated first amendment concerns. And in Scott v. Greenville County136 
and Moore v. Warwick Public School District No. 29, 137 the state deci-
sions implicated equal protection concerns. Because the Thompson 
and Logan decisions were designed to protect specific constitutional 
freedoms, they should not be extended to state decisions that do not 
infringe constitutionally protected activities. Furthermore, when state 
action does implicate protected activity, a federal court should decide 
the case on the ground that the activity is protected because a decision 
on no-evidence grounds provides little guidance for the courts and lit-
tle protection for future litigants. 138 
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AGAINST ARBITRARY STATE 
DECISIONS ls INCOMPATIBLE WITH FEDERALISM 
The rule against arbitrary state decisions, suggested by the 
Thompson, Logan, and Hicks decisions, is incompatible with federal-
ism because it permits federal courts to become the ultimate expositors 
of state law. In addition, federal court review of arbitrary state deci-
sions interferes with the state decisionmaking process by denying state 
branches of government the opportunity to evaluate and respond to 
one branch's arbitrary interpretation of state law. 
A. A Functional Analysis of the Rule Against Arbitrariness and the 
Doctrine of Federalism 
In Thompson, Logan, and Hicks, the Supreme Court never ex-
plained what values would be served by a rule against arbitrary state 
decisions. However, commentators in favor of a rule against arbitrary 
state decisions argue that the prohibition protects at least five values: 
press. The court may have sought to protect the plaintifrs (and her stairs) first amendment right 
to talk to the press. 
135. 840 F.2d 213, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1988),petitionforcert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. May 
27, 1988) (No. 87-1969). The Court, citing Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 529 (1974), held that a 
zoning board's refusal to grant an exemption to a video store may have violated due process. 
Additionally, the court said the decision may have violated the first amendment. 
136. 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 & nn.17, 19 (4th Cir. 1983). The court, citing Logan, held that 
the refusal to grant a building permit to a black man may violate substantive due process if the 
refusal violated state law. The court's equal protection concerns were made evident in its discus-
sion of the plaintifrs race discrimination claim. 
137. 794 F.2d 322, 323, 327-8 (8th Cir. 1986). The court, citing Logan, held that the school 
board may have violated substantive due process by arbitrarily firing the plaintiff after he became 
blind. The court made its equal protection concerns explicit when it held that the plaintiff had 
stated a valid claim for discrimination under a federal anti-discrimination law. 
138. Comment, Jackson v. Virginia, supra note 48, at 1588-89. 
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individual liberty, 139 accuracy, 140 consistency, 141 reliance, 142 and 
majoritarianism. 143 
It is not clear that the rule against arbitrariness would serve these 
values. Procedural guarantees at the state level ensure that a partici-
pant is given full opportunity to argue the law and facts of the case. 144 
Another layer of appellate review by the federal courts does not ensure 
a more accurate or consistent decision, but it does ensure additional 
costs and uncertainty while the case is pending. While an arbitrary 
decision may violate the expectations of some persons, the state court 
and agencies with discretionary power must have the power to change 
the law to conform to changing conditions and values. 145 The impor-
139. The concern for individual liberty arises from a concern that state decisionmakers will 
rely on "impermissible" factors in making their decisions. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW, supra note 21, at 220-21; Rubin, supra note 21, at 1103, 1105-06 & n.297 (Unfettered 
discretion may allow state agents to "demand bribes, seek unreasonable obeisance, take revenge, 
or act on the basis of caprice or inadvertence."); Smolla, supra note 21, at 501 (concern about 
"administrative action that goes beyond discretion into the realm of impermissible activity"); 
Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 488 (concern about "adjudicative procedural arbitrariness"); cf. 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 258-60 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (mandate stayed, 
403 U.S. 951 (1971), rehg. denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972), rehg. granted, vacated sub nom .. Cramp-
ton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972) (arguing that the underlying concern about vague statutes is a 
concern that courts might apply them for "impermissible" reasons). 
140. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279 (1977) (Judge-made law is 
only legitimate when the uniquely determined right answer is ascertained and followed.); Mor-
gan, Right To Know Why, supra note 21, at 333-44 (Requiring that states provide reasons for 
their decisions promotes accuracy.); Rubin, supra note 21, at 1102 (Concern for accuracy under-
lies due process.); Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 488 (Persons should have a right to be free from 
adjudicatory procedures that contain an "intolerable margin of probable error."). See generally 
Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CALIF. L. REV. 363, 374 (1986) [hereinafter 
Brilmayer, Death of Error]. 
141. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 595 (arguing for decisional consistency). 
142. Arbitrary state decisions may violate people's expectations about how they will be 
treated. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 617 (Arbitrary decisions do not provide 
defendants, police, prosecutors, or the courts with advance warning of the reach of state force.); 
J. RAz, supra note 21, at 220-26 (Arbitrary court decisions may violate expectations and make 
law incapable of guiding behavior for the social good.); Rubin, supra note 21, at 1105-6 & n.297 
("[T]he failure to follow applicable rules subjects individuals to a totally arbitrary regime, 
thereby denying them any possible control over their fate."). 
143. State court decisions or agency decisions that contradict legislative rules, these commen-
tators argue, violate the majority's will. See, e.g., Burin, The Theory of the Rule of Law and the 
Structure of the Constitutional State, 15 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 328 (arguing that judges cannot 
"act as lawmaker[s]" outside the "statutory frame"); Morgan, Right To Know Why, supra note 
21, at 333-44 (arguing that a requirement that judges provide reasons would promote public 
order and facilitate self-government); Rubin, supra note 21, at 1106, 1116-20 (emphasizing that, 
under the "traditional model of government," the legislature makes the rules while the judiciary 
must obey them). 
144. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981); Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 375 
(arguing that a state court decision on state law is "correct" whenever the parties "had an ade-
quate opportunity to present their arguments in court"). See also J. ELY, supra note 27, at 14-21 
(arguing that the doctrine of substantive due process is not justified historically or by the mean-
ing of the language). 
145. By overturning previous decisions and reinterpreting laws to reflect new conditions or 
values, the state court may thereby make the law more accurately reflect current majoritarian 
values. Brilmayer, Rights Thesis, supra note 22, at 1176-78. See also B. CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDlCIAL PROCESS 84-97 (1921) (1977 ed.). 
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tance of judicia1 decisionmaking is at the root of the common law tra-
dition. In addition, although strict judicial enforcement of statutes 
and regulations may serve the interests of majoritarianism, such en-
forcement may not be desirable. The judiciary and agencies with dis-
cretionary power need the flexibility to consider equitable factors 
when interpreting and applying the law to novel fact situations. Fur-
thermore, state courts and agencies need the power to disobey "bad" 
laws - such as laws ordering racia1 discrimination - to promote con-
stitutional and other external values. By allowing the federal courts to 
"correct" arbitrary state court and agency decisions, the federal courts 
prevent the state courts and agencies from operating as a va1uable 
check on the legislature. Strict application of statutes may, in some 
cases, lead to injustice if the state law at issue is unjust. 146 
1. Difficulties in Applying a Rule Against Arbitrary State Decisions 
A fundamental tension exists between the rule against arbitrariness 
and federalism. The arbitrariness rule would dictate that every error 
of state law presents a justiciable federa1 question. But federa1 court 
review of arbitrary state decisions intrudes into state power to decide 
issues of state law: decisions that appear to be arbitrary may in fact be 
valid interpretations of state law. A state decision that appears to be 
based on insufficient evidence may in reality be redefining the law to 
apply to the facts present in the case. 147 In addition, an arbitrary state 
decision that appears to conflict with a statute may actually be a rein-
terpretation or invalidation of the law. 148 Also, decisions that appear 
146. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision. in RONALD DWORKIN AND 
CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 88 (M. Cohen ed. 1983); Horwitz, Book Review, 86 YALE 
L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (arguing that legalist jurisprudence inevitably discourages the pursuit of 
substantive justice); Teachout, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 272-88 (1978) (arguing 
that the rule of law is only desirable when combined with a "respect for the fundamental worth 
and dignity of all persons" and a "central commitment to the ideals of equality, fairness, justice 
and freedom from arbitrary control"). But see Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 596-97 (arguing that 
pursuit of the rule of law does not necessarily exclude pursuit of higher values). 
Acceptance of this argument depends on one's view of the role of the state judiciary. Advo-
cates of the rule against arbitrariness are primarily concerned about state judicial tyranny. See, 
e.g., Rubin, supra note 21, at 1105-06. Opponents of the rule against arbitrariness are more 
concerned about state legislative tyranny. They advocate a strong judiciary as a means to combat 
legislative tyranny. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 374 n.20. 
147. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1141 (1986) 
(arguing that the Court should view "open-textured decisions" as ·~udicial formulation of law"); 
Comment, Jackson v. Virginia, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. at 1581-82, 1585-86 (1979) (arguing that 
state supreme court affirmances of convictions are "authoritative determinations that state law 
condemned whatever acts the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
Wechsler takes a different view, arguing that a state supreme court affirmance does not neces-
sarily mean the supreme court has redefined state law. Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1043, 1058-59 (1977). A state court affirmance of a conviction, Wechsler argues, is not 
necessarily an implied ruling that the element on which there was no evidence is no longer re-
quired by state law. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 617-18. 
148. Westen, Meaning of Equality, supra note 22, at 644 n.79 ("every alleged failure of a 
state court to comply with its own law can, conceptually, be described with equal validity as a 
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to be internally inconsistent may actually rest on unstated rationales 
or assumptions. 149 Federal court review of arbitrary state decisions is 
also problematic because states may allocate lawmaking power to dif-
ferent branches of government in any manner they choose. 15° For this 
reason, it is difficult for a federal court to decide that a decision by one 
branch is incorrect as a matter of state law because the decision may 
not yet have been evaluated by the other branches. 
The commentators who advocate a rule against arbitrariness rec-
ognize that such a rule would interfere with state decisionmaking 
processes. 151 To resolve this problem, they argue that state law errors 
should only create federal claims in certain instances, 152 such as when 
the error is a "clear mistake"153 or when it affects an individual's 
rights. 154 But these modifications do not avoid the problem. Even a 
modified rule against arbitrariness makes a federal court the final in-
terpreter of state law in some cases. Federal review, according to the 
rule against arbitrariness, is justified solely because the state has failed 
to decide its own law correctly. Such a rule would fundamentally 
change the nature of federal-state relations and thwart the values 
served by federalism. 
redefinition by the state court of what its own law really is") (emphasis in original); see also 
Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 369-71, 380 (arguing that state supreme courts are 
capable of "wobble," but they cannot err). However, in an earlier article, Brilmayer wrote in a 
footnote that "[i]n exceptional instances ... there may be Supreme Court review on the basis of 
arbitrariness, where the claim is that the decision is ad hoc rather than merely a change in law." 
Brilmayer, Rights Thesis, supra note 22, at 1179 n.19. But see Morgan, Playing by the Rules, 
supra note 21, at 6-7. 
149. See, e.g., cases cited in note 6supra; Cf. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
U.S. 4S8 (1981) (holding that due process does not require the board to state its reasons for 
denying applications for commutation of life sentences) .. 
lSO. See cases cited in note 26 supra. 
lSl. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 624-2S; Morgan, Right To Know Why, supra note 21, 
at 341, 343-44; Note, Guarantee Clause, supra note 21, at S78. 
1S2. Commentators place different limits on the application of the rule against arbitrary state 
decisions. Amsterdam admits that federal courts should not "get involved with correcting every 
nitty-gritty mistake of law made, for example, in a state criminal case in the application of state 
law." Instead, Amsterdam argues, federal courts should get involved only when the decision 
adversely affects a "vital and important interest" and when the decision can be considered 
"crazy." Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 626. Morgan and Smolla are concerned that states fol-
low their own procedures, but only certain procedures. Morgan argues that states should not 
violate "procedural safeguards" which only include "rules ... designed to protect individual's 
interests" and not "rules ... designed to promote efficiency or administrative convenience." 
Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 29-30. Smolla argues that "some rules should be 
breachable by either state or federal agencies," without specifying which rules "should be breach-
able." Smolla, supra note 21, at SOS. 
Rubin and Van Alstyne are more vague about their limitations on the rule against arbitrary 
state decisions. Rubin argues the "rule-obedience principle" should only apply when "the state 
brings its force to bear." Rubin, supra note 21, at 1107. Van Alstyne argues that the extent of 
the right to be free from arbitrary procedures depends on the "contextual considerations." Van 
Alstyne, supra note 21, at 488-89. 
1S3. Note, Guarantee Clause, supra note 21, at S79. 
1S4. Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 30; Note, Procedural Rights, supra note 
21, at 1024 n.20. 
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2. Values Served by Federalism 
The Constitution mandates that powers not granted to the federal 
government be reserved to the states.155 Federal courts may not re-
view the correctness of state court determinations of state law. 156 This 
principle of federalism - that state courts are the ultimate expositors 
of state law - serves at least three important values. 
First, with fifty different states formulating state law, the system 
provides fifty laboratories for multiple considerations of problems. 
Each state is free to create unique solutions unconstrained by a na-
tional standard.151 
Second, federalism promotes finality. Disputants know the state 
supreme court is the last forum in which to air grievances, providing 
final resolution of controversies and final interpretations of state law. 
Disputants are certain that these decisions will not be reversed later by 
another higher level court. An extra layer of review only adds. costs 
and uncertainty. 158 
Third, federalism prevents federal courts from interfering in state 
law-making processes. States are free to divide law-making power be-
tween state government branches in any manner they choose. While 
the federal constitution requires separation of powers for the federal 
government, it does not require separation of powers for state govern-
ments.159 Within each state, power is divided among different 
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.") 
156. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858) ("[T]he power of the General 
government, and of the state, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial 
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each 
other, within their respective spheres."); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 
(1874) (Congress does not have the power to authorize the Court to reverse the judgments of 
state courts in matters of state Jaw unrelated to the vindication of any federal right.). See gener-
ally Hart, The Relation Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 499, 502-03 
(1954) .. 
157. See Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 378; Thompson, supra note 21, at 426-
27. 
158. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952), reflected this 
concern for finality: 
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. 
That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different 
courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. 
There is not doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our 
reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, 
but we are infallible only because we are final. 
344 U.S. at 540 (Jackson, J. concurring). See also Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 
368, 383 (1986) (arguing that at some point the decision must be "hardened"); Wright, The 
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957) (arguing that extra 
layers of review do not ensure more justice, but may increase costs and delay). 
159. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) ("the 
states are free to allocate the lawmaking function to whatever branch of state government they 
may choose"); see also cases cited in note 26 supra. 
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branches of government according to the state constitution. Innova-
tion and conflict between the branches of state government may be 
part of the law-making process. 160 If the federal courts intervene 
when they disagree with a state court or agency's interpretation of 
state law, they deny that branch the power to decide issues of state law 
and, at the same time, deny other branches the opportunity to review 
the decision themselves. The result may be the skewing of the balance 
of power in the state. 
Federal courts should not review state decisions solely on the 
ground that they appear to violate state law. Federal courts should 
only review state court and agency actions that violate state law if the 
state action itself - without reference to state law - violates specific 
constitutional guarantees, such as procedural protections, equal pro-
tection prohibitions, or first amendment freedoms. 161 Federal court 
review of arbitrary state decisions permits federal courts to become the 
ultimate expositors of state law. The examination in Part III of the 
cases applying the rule against arbitrary decisions demonstrates that 
such review interferes with the values promoted by federalism. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE RULE AGAINST ARBITRARINESS 
DEMONSTRATES ITS INCOMPATIBILITY WITH 
FEDERALISM 
A number of courts have read the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks 
decisions broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. 
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held that Thompson supports a 
rule against arbitrary civil decisions that lack evidence. These courts 
have relied on the no-evidence doctrine to review decisions by state 
educational institutions and prisons to determine whether they were 
supported by evidence. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits 
have consistently interpreted Logan broadly to support a rule against 
arbitrary state decisions. These courts have relied on Logan to review 
a variety of state decisions, including zoning decisions, job termina-
160. See Hart, supra note 156, at 491-95, 499 (emphasizing the important position of state 
courts in relation to state legislatures and chief executives). 
161. The Court has held that when a state court finding of fact is important to deciding a 
constitutional issue, the Court may make an independent examination of the facts when a conclu-
sion oflaw relating to a federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled that it is necessary 
to analyze the facts in order to pass upon the federal question. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 
385-86 (1927). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at § 4033; Spann, 
supra note 120, at 971-72. 
The Court has also held that federal courts may review state procedural rules if these rules 
block a party from raising a federal question claim in the state courts. See generally WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at§§ 4023-4028; Spann, supra note 120. Limited review of 
state court decisions is also allowed whenever theoretically independent substantive state 
grounds are advanced to support disregard of federal claims. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 22, at §§ 4029-4033; Schlueter, Judicial Federalism and the Supreme Court 
Review of State Court Decisions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1984) (reviewing Burger 
Court's handling of ambiguous state court decisions). 
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tions, and business license revocations, to determine whether they vio-
lated state law. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that Hicks 
supports a rule against arbitrary state decisions, reviewing sentencing 
decisions to determine whether the state court applied the correct sen-
tencing statute. An examination of the cases interpreting Thompson, 
Logan, and Hicks to support a rule against arbitrariness demonstrates 
that this rule imposes an undue intrusion upon state power to decide 
issues of state law. 
A. The Cases Applying Thompson Intrude upon State Autonomy 
The Thompson decision has been widely criticized as "curious"162 
and "bound to lead ... into treacherous territory"163 because it poses 
the threat of significant federal intrusion into state court powers. The 
danger of the Thompson doctrine is that federal courts might reverse 
state decisions which appear to lack evidence under state law (as inter-
preted by the federal court), even though the state decisions can be 
equally well explained as valid applications of state law supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
The Sixth 164 and Eighth 165 Circuits have read the Thompson deci-
sion broadly to stand for the proposition that federal courts may re-
verse state civil decisions on substantive due process grounds when the 
federal court believes that the state decision is not supported by suffi-
cient evidence under state law. 166 These federal courts intervened to 
162. Tushnet, supra note 48, at 795-96; see also Note, No Evidence, supra note 48, at 1144 
(criticizing the Thompson and Garner decisions as imposing "an unwarranted and severe limita-
tion on a state's power to interpret its own law"). See generally Note, The Supreme Court, 1959 
Term, Thompson v. Louisville, 74 HARV. L. REv. 81, 108 (1960) (reviewing the facts of the case) 
[hereinafter Note, Thompson]; Comment, Evidence Required To Sustain Criminal Conviction, 62 
W. VA. L. REV. 384, 386 (1960) (praising the decision, and predicting that it could produce 
"more cautious observation of due process procedures and requirements by lesser tribunals") 
[hereinafter Comment, Evidence Required]. 
163. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 190 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
164. In Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit relied on 
Thompson in holding that state prison officials violated due process by refusing to allow a pris-
oner to receive a dictionary from his mother. The prison's decision violated due process, the 
court said, because the action was not supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy state law re-
quirements. For further discussion of Spruytte, see notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. 
165. In Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), vac. sub nom. Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308, 324-26 (1975), the Eighth Circuit reversed a high school board disciplinary 
action on the ground that there was "no evidence" that the students had violated the school 
district rule forbidding the use or possession of intoxicating beverages. Although the court of 
appeals did not cite Thompson, the Supreme Court said the court of appeals had applied the 
Thompson doctrine. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 323. For further discussion of Strickland, 
see notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text. 
166. In a separate line of cases that do not rely on Thompson, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that substantive due process requires that state government job dis-
missals must be supported by "substantial evidence." These courts view this requirement as a 
necessary corollary to procedural due process. See Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1027 (6th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2015 (1988) (doctor's dismissal must be "supported by sub-
stantial evidence to free it from arbitrariness," quoting Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 
842); Holley v. Seminore County School Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (due process 
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review state decisions, even though constitutionally required proce-
dural protections provided the parties affected with adequate opportu-
nity to argue their interpretations of state law before impartial state 
decisionmakers. 
The intrusiveness of this type of review can be seen in a number of 
the Thompson Supreme Court decisions which reversed state decisions 
for lack of evidence. In Thompson itself, the state court's decision may 
be equally well explained as a valid decision that Thompson's conduct 
in standing at the cafe and arguing with the police officer constituted 
loitering and disorderly conduct under the state statute.167 Similarly, 
in Garner v. Louisiana, the state court's decision may be equally well 
explained as a decision that the defendants' conduct in gathering at the 
lunch counter constituted disturbing the peace because the conduct 
could foreseeably have led to a public disturbance. 168 In Vachon v. 
New Hampshire, the state court's decision may also be explained as a 
decision that Vachon's conduct - controlling the premises when 
"someone" sold a nearly obscene button to a fourteen-year-old girl -
constituted willfully contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 169 
And in Douglas v. Buder, the state court's decision may be equally well 
explained as a decision that a traffic citation constituted an arrest for 
purposes of parole revocation.17° 
The danger of extending the Thompson doctrine is also evident in 
three federal court decisions which relied on the Thompson doctrine to 
reverse decisions of state educational institutions for lack of evidence. 
In Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 171 after excluding evi-
dence based on fourth amendment grounds, the district court con-
requires that there be "a rational basis for the deprivation of an individual's property"); Klinge v. 
Lutheran Charities Assn., 523 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1975) (doctor's dismissal must be supported 
by "substantial evidence"); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1970) (due process 
requires more than "mere ceremonial compliance with procedural due process"); see also Byrd v. 
City of Atlanta, 683 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (policeman's dismissal must be supported by 
substantial evidence); Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 
1973) (school teacher's dismissal). But see Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 888 (2d 
Cir. 1987) (refusing to review a denial of tow car medallions, and stating that "[s]ection 1983 is 
not a means for litigating in a federal forum whether a state or local administrative decision was 
arbitrary and capricious"). 
167. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). For the argument that the 
Thompson state court decision was a valid attempt to redefine state law, see Garner v. Louisiana, 
368 U.S. 157, 189 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); Note, No Evidence, supra note 48, at 1143-44; 
Comment, Conviction Without Evidence, supra note 107, at 309; see also notes 34-40 supra and 
accompanying text. 
168. Garner, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). For the argument that the Garner state court decision was 
a valid attempt to redefine state law, see Garner, 368 U.S. at 190 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note, 
No Evidence, supra note 48, at 1144. 
169. Vachon, 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (per curiam). For the argument that the Vachon state 
court decision was a deliberate attempt to redefine state law, see Vachon, 414 U.S. at 486 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Spann, supra note 120, at 949-50; see also note 120 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
170. 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973). See also note 50 supra. 
171. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
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eluded that there was no evidence to support a school board's 
disciplinary action, so it reversed the board's action. The court de-
cided the state law issue and failed to give the school board or a state 
court an opportunity to decide for themselves whether the remaining 
evidence would justify the disciplinary action under state law. 172 
Two other educational institution decisions - Regents of the Uni-
versity of Michigan v. Ewing113 and Wood v. Strickland114 - also 
demonstrate the intrusiveness of federal court review of state civil de-
cisions. In both cases, federal review only added costs and uncertainty 
and did not ensure a more correct result. The controversy in Ewing 
arose in 1981 when a nine-member committee reviewed Ewing's rec-
ord and dismissed him from the university's six-year undergraduate/ 
medical school program. Ewing's record revealed that he had low 
grades, seven incompletes, several terms during which he had carried 
an irregular or reduced course load, and a failing score on the medical 
board exam - the lowest score in the program's history. Before the 
school made its final decision to dismiss him, Ewing was provided 
with four separate hearings in front of two different committees to 
challenge the action personally. 175 Ewing chose not to seek judicial 
relief under state law in state court but instead brought an action in 
federal court, claiming that the university violated his due process 
rights by arbitrarily expelling him.176 The district court dismissed 
Ewing's due process claim, 177 the court of appeals upheld the claim, 178 
and the Supreme Court finally dismissed the claim four years after the 
controversy arose, 179 agreeing with the district court that the univer-
sity "had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the program."180 As 
Justice Powell stated in concurrence, "this is a case that never should 
have been litigated."181 
In Strickland v. Inlow, the Eighth Circuit reversed a school board 
disciplinary action on the ground that there was "no evidence" that 
172. Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 239. In Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975), 
the court faced a situation similar to Jones, but the Smyth court provided a more sensible rem-
edy. The Smyth court excluded evidence from a disciplinary hearing, and then, unlike the Jones 
court, remanded the case to allow the school to retry it or dismiss the charges. 499 F. Supp. at 
795. 
173. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
174. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
175. 474 U.S. at 216-17, 227. 
176. Ewing v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 559 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1983), revd., 742 
F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1984), revd., 474 U.S. 214 (1985); see also Amicus Brief for Ewing, supra note 
78, at 7-10 (arguing that Thompson and Hill support a broad rule against arbitrary state decisions 
depriving both liberty and property interests). 
177. Ewing, 559 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
178. Ewing, 742 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1984). 
179. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
180. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227 (quoting 559 F. Supp. at 800). 
181. Ewing, 474 U.S. 230 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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the students violated the school district rule prohibiting the use or pos-
session of intoxicating liquor. 182 Although the Supreme Court re-
served judgment on the issue of whether the Thompson doctrine 
applies to school board decisions, 183 it reversed the Eighth Circuit's 
application of the doctrine. The school board's decision that the stu-
dents violated the state regulation by spiking punch with malt liquor, 
the Court said, was actually the correct interpretation of state law. 184 
Rather than lacking evidence, the school board decision was a valid 
interpretation and application of state law. Calling the court of ap-
peals' reliance on Thompson "improvident," the Court emphasized 
that federal courts should not use section 1983 as a vehicle to review 
school board decisions that do not violate specific constitutional 
guarantees. 185 
The First and Ninth Circuits have refused to apply Thompson to 
state civil decisions, but they have given only cursory reasons for their 
refusal. 186 Thompson should not be applied to civil decisions because 
the application of the Thompson doctrine interferes with state auton-
omy. As stated in the dissent to the court of appeals decision in 
Strickland, a broad reading of Thompson "inevitably [leads] to an un-
warranted invasion of the duties and responsibilities of state and local 
governments. " 187 
B. The Cases Applying Logan Intrude upon State Autonomy 
An examination of the cases in which the federal courts relied on 
Logan to review state decisions for arbitrariness also demonstrates 
that such review similarly intrudes upon state power. A number of 
courts of appeals have relied on Logan in upholding substantive due 
process claims against a variety of state decisions. The Logan rule 
182. 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), vac. sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 324· 
26 (1975). 
183. 420 U.S. at 323. 
184. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 323-26. The court of appeals interpreted the school board regu-
lation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating liquor with reference to the term "intoxi· 
eating liquor" as defined in other state statutes. 485 F.2d at 190; 420 U.S. at 324. However, 
testimony at trial had convincingly established that the term "intoxicating beverage" in the 
school regulation was not intended at the time of its adoption to be linked to the definition of any 
state statutes or to any other technical definition of "intoxicating." 420 U.S. at 324. 
185. 420 U.S. at 326. 
186. In Rose V. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1982), the First Circuit refused 
to apply Thompson to review a school board's disciplinary action. Thompson did not apply, the 
court said, simply because "[w]e are not dealing here ... with criminal punishments or sending 
someone to prison without evidence." See 619 F.2d at 282; see also Valazquez v. Thompson, 321 
F. Supp. 34, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ajfd., 451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusing to apply Thompson 
in an eviction proceeding). In United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 
702 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Thompson to a civil forfeiture 
proceeding, stating only that Thompson was "distinguishable" because Thompson "concerns a 
criminal conviction." See 702 F.2d at 1283. 
187. Strickland, 485 F.2d at 192 (McHaffy, J., dissenting). 
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against arbitrary state decisions has been described in the following 
manner: "[T]akings without any justification are 'governmental ac-
tions that even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protec-
tion, are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of 
due process.' " 188 The types of state decisions reviewed include zoning 
decisions, 189 employment terminations, 190 a business license revoca-
tion, 191 a prisoner's reading access decision, 192 and a state tort judg-
ment payment decision. 193 In most of these cases, the plaintiffs sought 
relief in federal court before appealing to the state court to determine 
whether the agency action violated state law. The federal court review 
of the state agency actions, prior to a state court ruling, intruded upon 
the state decisionmaking processes by denying the state court an op-
portunity to consider the agency's interpretation of state law. 
The zoning cases demonstrate the intrusiveness of federal court re-
view of arbitrary state decisions. The court in each case held that the 
plaintiff had a cognizable substantive due process claim on the ground 
that the zoning board or officials had arbitrarily violated state law.194 
188. Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Parratt v. Tay-
lor, 451 U.S. 527, 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Panels of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits have also interpreted Logan to support a rule against arbitrary decisions, while 
panels of the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the arbitrariness rule without 
citing Logan. Different panels in all seven of these circuits have expressed great reluctance or 
refused to adopt the rule against arbitrary state decisions. See notes 15-17 supra and notes 194, 
208, & 217-225 infra and accompanying text. 
189. See, e.g., Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (5th Cir.), rehg. 
ordered, 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985), rehg. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 
U.S. 905 (1986) (denial of zoning variance); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 
& n.17 (4th Cir. 1983) (denial of building permit). 
In Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 
3850 (U.S. May 28, 1988) (No. 87-1968); Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d ·213, 217 
(3d Cir. 1988); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1986) (denial of building 
permit) and Southern Coop Dev. Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347, 1355-56 (11th Cir.) (zoning 
commission refusal to approve plat in violation oflocal laws), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 120-8 (1983), 
the courts also decided that arbitrary zoning decisions violated due process, although they did 
not rely on Logan. 
190. The courts in Moore v. Warwick Pub. School Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 329-30 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (job termination in violation of contract), and Barnett v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 
707 F.2d 1571, 1577 (11th Cir. 1983) (same), decided that arbitrary state job terminations violate 
due process, although they did not rely on Logan. See also Byrd v. City of Atlanta, 683 F. Supp. 
804, 809 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (citing Logan in holding that a job termination in violation of a city 
ordinance may violate substantive due process). 
191. In Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1983) (refusal to grant barbershop 
license), the court decided that arbitrary license denials violate due process, although the court 
did not rely on Logan. 
192. Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1985) (prison refusal to allow pris-
oner to receive dictionary in violation of state administrative rule), cert. denied, 474; U.S. 1054 
(1986) see also Anderson v. City of New York, 611 F. Supp. 481, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (judi-
cial affirmance of police officer's refusal to return photos). 
193. Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1298 (7th Cir. 1982) (delayed payment of tort 
judgment in violation of state law). 
194. Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) ("deliberate and arbitrary abuse of 
government power violates an individual's right to substantive due process"), petition for cert. 
filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. May 28, 1988) (No. 87-1968); Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 
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In each. case, the applicants had been granted procedurally adequate 
hearings before the decision was made.195 The federal courts upheld 
the substantive due process claims, despite the fact that the local zon-
ing boards had been given discretion as quasi-legislative bodies to 
make zoning decisions. 196 The courts undertook extensive review of 
the applicable local zoning laws and ordinances to determine whether 
the zoning boards had adopted the correct interpretation of their own 
zoning laws. The federal courts, in these cases, essentially acted as 
zoning boards of appeals. The net result in each case was that federal 
court intervention disrupted the zoning decisionmaking process in that 
particular state.197 State courts normally play an important role in 
developing zoning law because the zoning board decisions are review-
840 F.2d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating government "arbitrarily 
or irrationally" denied an exemption), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3850 (U.S. May 27, 
1988) (No. 87-1964); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1986) ("substantive 
due process claim ... that the City acted capriciously and arbitrarily" in denying the building 
permit); Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir.) ("genuine dispute .•• 
as to whether the seemingly arbitrary denials of the parking variance were reasonably based in 
fact"), rehg. ordered, 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985), rehg. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 (4th Cir. 1983) 
("meritorious" claim that the county took property by manifest arbitrariness and unfairness"); 
Southern Coop. Dev. Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) ("refusal to [ap· 
prove proposed plat] was a violation of the plaintifrs guarantee of due process"). 
In later decisions, different panels of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits have reconsidered these 
broad pronouncements regarding substantive due process analysis of zoning decisions. In Lemke 
v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en bane) the court indicated its 
reluctance to follow its earlier statements in Littlefield. The court stated that "whether a sub-
stantive due process claim may arise from a denial of a zoning permit is an open question in this 
circuit." 846 F2d at 470-71. In Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 480 (5th Cir.) 
(reh. en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986) [hereinafter Shelton II], the court criticized its 
earlier Shelton decision for "insisting upon trial-type proof of both the purpose, or basis, of the 
Zoning Board decision and the rationality of its attainment." The court stated: "[W]e are confi· 
dent that the panel did not intend this result." 780 F.2d at 480. 
A different panel of the Eleventh Circuit also recently took a narrower approach to a zoning 
committee decision than the panel in Southern Coop. E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 
1114 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1225 (1988). In addressing an equal protection 
challenge to a sewage permit denial decision, the court expressed its unwillingness to find that 
"any departure from state law would give rise to a constitutional claim." 830 F.2d at 1114 
(emphasis in original). 
195. In Bello, the building permit denial had been upheld by the state lower court, but the 
state court later reversed its decision. 840 F.2d at 1126. In Neiderhiser, the exemption denial 
had been upheld by the board, but the state lower court reversed the decision. 840 F.2d at 215. 
In Littlefield, the building permit denial had been upheld by the zoning board and the city coun-
cil after "a series of meetings." 785 F.2d at 603. In Shelton, 754 F.2d at 1258, the denial of a 
parking variance had been upheld by the zoning board and the city planning director. The court 
noted that judicial review was readily available in the state courts. 754 F.2d at 1257-58. In Scott, 
716 F.2d at 1413, the denial of the building permit had been upheld by the city council, a state 
trial court, and the state supreme court, but the state supreme court later ordered the city council 
to grant the permit. In Southern Coop, 696 F.2d at 1349-50, the county commission twice re· 
jected the application after lengthy review. 
196. See Shelton IL 780 F.2d at 480-82 (arguing that zoning board decisions should be 
viewed as quasi-legislative). But see Scott, 716 F.2d at 1420 n.16. 
197. See Shelton IL 780 F.2d at 481 (expressing reluctance to "inject federal courts into 
matters historically the business of states [and] ..• alter the decisional processes for zoning 
issues"). 
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able in the state courts.19s 
In two cases, a federal court intervened before the state court had 
the opportunity to review the zoning board decision, depriving the 
state courts of their role in the decisionmaking process. 199 In three 
other cases, the errors were rectified by the state courts. 200 But the 
federal courts held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action because 
they were damaged during the period before the state courts rectified 
the errors as a matter of law. The federal courts basically served as 
cheerleaders for the state courts, praising their finding that the zoning 
actions violated state law.201 These cases support the curious result 
that state agency actions that violate state law violate due process, un-
less the state rectifies the error within a certain period of time. 
A number of courts have attempted to limit the application of the 
Logan rule by relying on a distinction the Logan Court made between 
systematic violations of state law and random, unauthorized violations 
of state law. Under this theory, a state action in violation of state law 
can be cured by post-deprivation procedures if the action was random 
and unauthorized. 202 In contrast, a state action in violation of state 
law cannot be cured by post-deprivation procedures if it was system-
atic, established state procedure.203 
The Logan Court made the distinction in attempting to differenti-
ate its holding from its earlier holding in Parratt v. Taylor. 204 Parratt 
addressed the issue of what types of procedural due process protec-
tions are required when a state official deprives an individual of a lib-
erty or property interest in violation of state law.205 In Parratt, a 
prison official negligently took a prisoner's property in violation of 
state regulations. The Court held that due process required only a 
post-deprivation hearing, because prison supervisors cannot foresee 
198. State judicial review of zoning board decisions was available in Bello, 840 F.2d at 1126; 
Neiderhiser, 840 F.2d at 215; Littlefield, 785 F.2d at 601 n.4; Shelton, 754 F.2d at 1258; and 
Scott, 716 F.2d at 1419. The record in Southern Coop., 696 F.2d at 1351, does not reveal whether 
state court review was available. 
199. Littlefield, 785 F.2d at 598-99; Shelton, 754 F.2d at 1254. In Shelton IL the court criti-
cized the plaintiffs for not seeking initial relief in state court to determine whether, in fact, they 
had a right to the variance. "It can be argued that because [plaintiffs] bypassed this state-fur-
nished remedy, the state did not deprive them of any property" in the first place. Shelton IL 780 
F.2d at 479. 
200. In Bello, the state court ordered the municipality to grant the permit eight months after 
the court initially refused to grant relief. 840 F.2d at 1126. In Neiderhiser, the state court or-
dered the board to grant the exemption eight months after the board's decision. 840 F.2d at 214-
15. In Scott, the state supreme court ordered the city council to grant the permit sixteen months 
after the court initially affirmed the denial. 716 F.2d at 1413. 
201. Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129; Neiderhiser, 840 F.2d at 217; Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423. 
202. See generally Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 10 n.46 (criticizing this 
reading of Parratt and Logan). 
203. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982). 
204. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981). 
205. 451 U.S. at 541; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (discussing Parratt). 
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"random and unauthorized" actions and because the governmental in-
terests at stake may require a prison official to act quickly.206 
The Logan Court recognized that its holding seemed to conflict 
with Parratt because it now suggested that state actions deviating from 
state law violate due process, regardless of the procedural protections 
provided. The Logan Court held that post-deprivation remedies did 
not cure the due process problems. It made a feeble attempt to distin-
guish Parratt, saying that it did not apply where "the state system 
itself" destroyed a complainant's property interest "by operation of 
[state] law" or by systematic and "established state procedure." In-
stead, Parratt applied only where the state's action constituted "ran-
dom and unauthorized" action by a state official. 207 According to this 
distinction, post-deprivation remedies may cure state decisions that vi-
olate state law by "random and unauthorized" action, but not state 
decisions that violate state law by "established state procedure."208 
The difficult task is, of course, determining whether a state court 
or agency violation of state law is "by operation of state law" or "un-
authorized." In practice, this distinction is almost impossible to make, 
especially when a state court made the "arbitrary" decision. Two re-
cent cases, Holloway v. Walker 209 and Anderson v. City of New 
York, 210 illustrate the problem. In Holloway, the plaintiffs, having lost 
a state law claim at the state trial and appellate levels, sued the trial 
judge in federal court claiming that the judge's deviation from state 
law denied them a fair trial.211 In particular, they argued that the 
judge's action constituted established state procedure, and thus vio-
206. 451 U.S. at 541. See generally Blum, Applying the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine: Defining 
the Scope of the Logan Established State Procedure Exception and Determining the Adequacy of 
State Postdeprivation Remedies, 13 HA5f1NGS CoNsr. L.Q. 695 (1986); Morgan, Playing by the 
Rules, supra note 21, at 10 n.46. 
207. 455 U.S. at 436; see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (holding that a state's 
procedural system only constitutes a denial of due process if the procedures are "constitutionally 
inadequate" and "fundamentally unfair"). 
208. Applying this distinction to different fact situations, a number of federal courts have 
concluded that certain alleged violations were random and unauthorized, and therefore curable 
by state post-deprivation hearings. These courts deemed a variety of state decisions, including a 
job payment decision, see Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 81, 85-87 (3d Cir. 1984) (hold· 
ing that state officials did not violate due process by denying back-pay after charges supporting 
the discharge later proved unfounded), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1029 (1984); a judicial action, see 
Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a judge did not violate 
due process when he allegedly violated state law); a zoning decision, see Albery v. Reddig, 718 
F.2d 245, 249-51, 249 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a zoning board refusal to grant a zoning 
variance in violation of state law did not violate due process); and a business license revocation, 
see Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte, 685 F.2d 192, 193-95 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (holding that the 
refusal to approve taxicab license in violation of state law did not violate due process), to be 
random and unauthorized. No Logan due process violations were found, because the state law 
violations were cured by the presence of state procedural safeguards. 
209. 784 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1986). 
210. 611 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
211. 784 F.2d at 1289-90. 
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lated due process despite the availability of state appellate review.212 
The Fifth Circuit correctly rejected the due process claim, but only 
after straining to characterize the judge's action as unauthorized state 
action in order to bring it within the scope of Parratt. 213 
In Anderson, the federal district court examined the petitioner's 
claim that a police officer's failure to return photos violated due pro-
cess. The state trial court had held that the failure to return the 
photos did not violate state law. The district court held that the police 
officer's action (anQ. the state court's affirmance) constituted a system-
atic deprivation without due process, because "the state system itself" 
caused the deprivation by a systematic failure to enforce the rules.214 
Thus, the availability of post-deprivation review in state court was ir-
relevant. The federal court was able to impose its own interpretation 
of state law on the state court by characterizing the state court's deci-
sion as a "systematic" violation of law. 
The practical difficulties in applying the distinction between acts 
"operative of state law" and those that are merely "unauthorized" are 
compounded by the emptiness of the concept itself. This emptiness is 
readily apparent from the fact that the federal courts have placed dif-
ferent labels on similar sorts of state action. For example, similar 
types of state judicial actions that apparently deviated from state law 
have been found to be both authorized and unauthorized state ac-
tion. 215 Similar inconsistencies have arisen in connection with certain 
state zoning decisions in apparent violation of state law.216 
A number of courts have explicitly refused to interpret Logan 
broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. These 
courts have declined to review the arbitrariness of zoning decisions,217 
212. 784 F.2d at 1291. 
213. 784 F.2d at 1292. The court noted that "no judicial system offers any guarantee, other 
than the postdeprivation right of appeal, that an individual judge will not act arbitrarily or cor-
ruptly." 784 F.2d at 1292. 
214. 611 F. Supp. at 491-92. 
215. Compare Holloway, 784 F.2d at 1290-92 (judicial actions constituted unauthorized ac-
tion) with Anderson, 611 F. Supp. at 491-92 (judicial actions constituted authorized action). 
216. Compare Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 249-51, 249 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983) (refusal to 
grant zoning variance in violation of state law constituted a "substantive mistake" rather than 
"established state procedure") with Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 
(5th Cir.), rehg. ordered, 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985), rehg. 780 F.2d 475 (5th Cir.) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986) (denial of zoning variance constituted "established state proce-
dure") and Southern Coop. Dev. Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir.) (zoning 
commission refusal to approve plat in violation of local laws constituted "authorized" action), 
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983). 
217. See, e.g., Muckway v. Craft, 789 F.2d 517, 521-23 ('Zth Cir. 1986); Raskiewicz v. Town 
of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that "federal courts do not sit as a super 
zoning board or a zoning board of appeals"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); Cloutier v. Town 
of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that "misapplication ... of zoning laws 
[is not] cognizable under section 1983"); Chiplin Enter. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524, 1528 
(1st Cir. 1983) (stating that "a mere bad faith refusal to follow state law in such local administra-
tive matters simply does not amount to a deprivation of due process"); Scudder v. Town of 
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job terminations,218 a business license rejection,219 a child custody de-
cision,220 and a job payment decision.221 Notably, the First Circuit 
has most consistently adhered to such a narrow reading of Logan. In 
a number of these decisions, the courts have noted that a broad read-
ing of Logan directly conflicts with Parratt.222 Others have placed 
particular emphasis on the fact that the litigants had ample opportu-
nity to present their interpretation of state law to a state agency or in a 
judicial hearing. 223 
Moreover, these courts have reasoned that the Logan arbitrariness 
rule would intrude upon state power to decide state law issues and 
interfere with state lawmaking processes.224 Significantly, these courts 
have stated that the added layer of federal review does not ensure a 
more correct result. 225 State court or agency actions that violate state 
law should only give rise to due process concerns if the state action in 
itself - without reference to state law - violates due process; that is, 
conduct that violates state law should not give rise to a federal claim 
just because it violates state law unless it implicates federal constitu-
tional protections, such as fourth amendment or procedural due pro-
Greendale, 704 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1983); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 
822, 831-33 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Parrott). 
218. See, e.g., Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 718 (5th Cir. 1987); Mangels v. 
Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986); Bowens v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 
710 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1983). 
219. Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (examining refusal to 
renew business license and stating that "mere violations of state law do not, of course, create 
constitutional claims"). 
220. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). 
221. Brown v. Brienen, 722 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "there is no rule that 
every breach of a public employment contract is a deprivation of property within the meaning of 
the due process clause"). 
222. In Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 718 (5th Cir. 1987), the court stated the 
conflict succinctly: 
[A]llowing (the Logan substantive due process] claim would effectively eviscerate the hold· 
ing of Parratt. . . . It would allow a plaintiff to challenge a deprivation of a property interest 
on the ground that it resulted from arbitrary and capricious state action, while under Par· 
ratt/Hudson he would not be able to state a claim for the deprivation of the same right on 
the ground that it resulted from a random and unauthorized act of a state official. This 
remarkable result clearly was not envisioned by the Court in Parratt or Hudson. 
813 F.2d at 718 (citation omitted). See also Monaghan, supra note 76, at 994 (arguing that a 
broad interpretation of Ewing conflicts with Parratt). 
223. See, e.g., Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d at 718; Bowens v. North Carolina 
Dept. of Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1983); Creative Environments, Inc. v. 
Estabrook, 680 F.2d at 832 n.9; Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d at 514. 
224. See, e.g., Muckway v. Craft, 789 F.2d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 1986); Roy v. City of Augusta, 
712 F.2d at 1523; Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1983); Flower 
Cab Co. v. Petitte, 685 F.2d 192, 193-95 (7th Cir. 1982); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Esta-
brook, 680 F.2d at 831-33; Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F. Supp. 
1216, 1219 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d at 514; Urban Sanitation Corp. v. City 
of Pell City, 662 F. Supp. 1041, 1046 & n.12 (N.D. Ala. 1986). 
225. See, e.g., Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d at 1523 (arguing that state law disputes 
should be left to state courts and agencies); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d at 515 ("the courts of 
Indiana seem every bit as determined to prevent .•• wrongs as the federal courts"). 
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cess protections.226 For these reasons, Logan should not be read 
broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. Logan 
should instead be limited to its facts. 
C. The Cases Applying Hicks Intrude upon State Autonomy 
Only the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Hicks to support a rule 
against arbitrary decisions. In two cases, the Fifth Circuit relied on 
Hicks in holding that a state court violates due process if it applies the 
incorrect state sentencing statute.227 In each case, the trial judge's de-
cision was affirmed by the state supreme court. The federal court re-
versed the state supreme court's interpretation of its own law and 
became the ultimate expositor of state law. 
In three other cases, the Fifth Circuit has held that state sentenc-
ing decisions violate due process if it appears the judge was not aware 
of his sentencing alternatives. 228 As interpreted by district courts in 
that circuit, these decisions effectively impose a reasons requirement 
on state judges: they can escape the Hicks prohibition only by explain-
ing their reasons for their decisions.229 But the imposition of a reasons 
requirement on state sentencing judges contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent holding that state judges are not constitutionally required to 
state their reasons for making such decisions. 230 
Other courts of appeals have refused to interpret Hicks to support 
a rule against arbitrary decisions. The Tenth and Seventh Circuits 
226. See e.g., Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986) ("the alleged violation 
must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process 
Clause"); Mann v. City of Tucson Dept. of Police, 782 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986) (search and 
seizure which violated state law may be unconstitutional). 
227. Brown v. Estelle, 712 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1983) (increase in length of sentence held 
improper judicial conduct in light of state statutes and case law), modified on rehg., 721 F.2d 
1037 (5th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Estelle, 689 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1982) (sentencing judge relied 
on incorrect statute). 
The Supreme Court has only relied on Hicks to reverse one other state court decision. In 
Sam v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 931 (1980), the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Hicks. 
228. Williams v. Maggio, 730 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1984); Hickerson v. Maggio, 691 F.2d 792 
(5th Cir. 1982); Willeford v. Estelle, 637 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1981). 
The Fifth Circuit summarized its interpretation of Hicks in Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 
703 (5th Cir. 1988). The court stated that the liberty interest recognized in Hicks entitles a state 
criminal defendant to (1) "a sentencing decision ... by the sentencing authority designated under 
state law" and (2) a decision by the designated sentencing authority with "knowledge and under-
standing of the range of sentencing discretion under state law." The court did not find a Hicks 
violation in Dupuy because there was no showing that the judge lacked an understanding of his 
discretionary powers or that the defendant suffered prejudice. Dupuy, 837 F.2d at 704. 
229. See Bullard v. Estelle, 502 F. Supp. 887, 890 (N.D. Tex. 1980), affd., 665 F.2d 1347 (5th 
Cir. 1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Airington v. Lindley, 506 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. 
Okla. 1980). 
230. See, e.g., Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 (1985) (trial judge in probation revoca-
tion decisions not required to explain why alternatives to incarceration not selected); Harris v. 
Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1981) (trial judge not required to explain apparent inconsistency 
between verdicts). 
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have refused to apply Hicks to reverse state court decisions which al-
legedly deviated from state law.231 These courts correctly noted that a 
broad application of Hicks would intrude upon state power to decide 
issues of state law.232 In Hutchinson v. Marshal/, 233 one of the few 
cases discussing the application of Hicks to a nonsentencing state judi-
cial decision, the district court clearly stated the federalism concerns. 
In that case, the defendant, relying on Hicks, claimed that the Ohio 
courts "arbitrarily" denied his rights under the Ohio Speedy Trial Act. 
The court rejected this argument. "Even assuming that the state 'devi-
ated' from a proper application of the Ohio Speedy Trial Act," the 
court said, the petitioner received due process because "he was able to 
present his objections on that score to the Ohio appellate courts." 
Furthermore, the court concluded that "[p]etitioner's arguments 
[were] nothing more than a disagreement with how the Ohio appellate 
courts dealt with (and rejected) his efforts to prevail under an Ohio 
statute. "234 
CONCLUSION 
The Thompson, Logan, and Hicks cases should be read narrowly 
for two reasons. First, a close reading of the cases reveals that the 
Court may have been primarily concerned about protecting other con-
stitutional guarantees implicated by the state decisions. These guaran-
tees include sixth amendment criminal procedural protections and 
constitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech and equal protec-
tion. The Court appears to have relied on the rule against arbitrary 
state decisions to avoid addressing more difficult constitutional issues 
involved in the state action. Second, if federal courts rely on these 
cases to support federal court review of arbitrary state decisions, the 
federal courts will intrude upon state power to create and interpret 
state law. State decisions which a federal court believes arbitrarily de-
viated from state law may in fact be valid attempts by the state courts 
to redefine state law. In addition, federal court review of decisions 
that appear to violate state law is disruptive to the state lawmaking 
231. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1271 n.13 (10th Cir. 1986) (right to sentencing 
standard), cen. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1491 (1988); Kelsie v. Trigg, 657 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(failure of judge to submit sentencing decision to jury); Drennon v. Hess, 642 F.2d 1204, 1205 
(10th Cir. 1981) (right to resentencing by jury) (per curiam); see also Gilcrist v. Kincheloe, 589 
F. Supp. 291, 296 (E.D. Wash. 1984) (right to jury trial), affd., 774 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(mem.); Hutchinson v. Marshall, 573 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (right to speedy trial) 
ajfd., 744 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1984), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 1221 (1985). 
232. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d at 1271 n.13 ("[T]he [state] court considered whether he 
had a right to be resentenced ..• and decided the question against him. Hicks is inapposite."); 
Kelsie v. Trigg, 657 F.2d at 158 ("[T]he Supreme Court of Indiana has decided that Indiana law 
does not give her the right."); Drennon v. Hess, 642 F.2d at 1205 ("[T]he proper construction of 
this statutory scheme ••. is plainly a matter of state law in the first instance."). 
233. 573 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
234. 573 F. Supp. at 500. 
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processes within each state. Unlike the federal government, the states 
are free to divide state lawmaking power between state government 
branches in any manner the states choose. As the First Circuit suc-
cinctly stated, a rule against arbitrary state decisions would allow 
"every disgruntled applicant [to move state law disputes] into the fed-
eral courts, even when the state provided adequate procedures, [and] 
any meaningful separation between federal and state jurisdiction 
would cease."235 Thus far, most federal courts have correctly refused 
to read the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks decisions broadly, recogniz-
ing that such a reading would violate the rule that state courts are the 
ultimate expositors of state law. 
- David T. Azrin 
235. Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1st Cir. 1983). 
